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Abstract 
 
 
Since 2000, Chinese FDI in Zambia has steadily increased. Focused predominantly on 
resource extraction, China is now the third largest investor in Zambia, after only the 
United States and South Africa. As the title suggests, this FDI is recognized as 
relevant to Zambia’s developmental discourse. However, with general development 
indicators, there is challenge in establishing immediate causality between (Chinese) 
FDI and development. To address this, this study employs Capability Approach 
development theory, which utilizes a framework to evaluate social and political 
realities. Utilizing this framework, key indicators are used to look more deeply into 
the discussion around China’s FDI for Zambia’s development. There has been a great 
deal of speculation as to potential costs and/or benefits Chinese FDI may offer 
Zambia. As China offers Zambia a partnership of non-domestic interference, unique 
from Zambia’s traditional western syndicates, debate is raised as to what influence it 
will have on Zambia’s developmental progress.  
  
With challenges including limited information, numerous potential indicators to 
utilize, and a large number of contributing voices, the debate thus far lacks a means 
for evaluating the substance of claims made within the context of national trends. This 
study reviews and evaluates the debate within the framework of seven key socio-
economic and political indicators. While within economic growth and infrastructure 
expansion Chinese FDI are shown to indicate a conduciveness to development, FDI is 
not shown to be conducive for market diversification, challenging corruption, or 
strengthening institutions. The study therefore shows that trends of Chinese FDI’s 
relevance to Zambian employment and state dependency to be mixed and that 
assessments will need to disentangle various Chinese activities and will also need to 
consider contradictory effects.  
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
	   iii	  
Opsomming 
 
 
Sedert die jaar 2000 het Chinese direkte buitelandse belegging (DBB) in Zambië 
stelselmatig begin toeneem. Die groei is hoofsaaklik gekonsentreer in die hulpbron 
ontgunnings sektore. China is tans die derde grootste belegger in Zambia naas die 
Verenigde State van Amerika en Suid Afrika. Soos die titel van die tesis aandui, word 
DBB beskou as relevant tot Zambië se ontwikkelings dialoog. Aangesien die 
oorsaaklikheid tussen DBB en ontwikkeling nie maklik vasgestel kan word nie, word 
sleutel aanwysers gebruik om dieper in die gesprek rondom Chinese DBB ten opsigte 
van Zambiese ontwikkeling in te kyk. Tans is daar 'n groot mate van spekulasie aan 
potensiële risikos en/of voordele van Chinese DBB vir Zambië. China bied Zambië ‘n 
venootskap sonder inmenging in binnelandse beleid, anders as Westerse finansiering 
wat gekoppel word aan voorwaardes, en dit is wat die vraag lig; wat gaan die 
uiteindelikke invloed en effek wees op Zambiese ontwikkeling in die toekoms. 
 
Met uitdagings soos beperkte inligting, vele moontlikke aanwysers en ‘n groot aantal 
opinies, kort die debad tot dusver die vermoë om die waarde van argumente te 
evalueer binne die konteks van nasionale tendense. Hierdie studie evalueer die debat 
binne die raamwerk van sewe sleutel sosio-ekonomiese en politiese aanwysers. 
Chinese DBB word bevind om bevorderlik te wees ten opsigte van ontwikkeling in 
die infrastruktuur ontwikkeling- en ekonomiese groei sektore; dit word egter nie 
bevind as bevorderlik in terme van mark-diversifikasie, die teenkanting van korrupsie, 
of in die versterking van politieke instellings nie. Chinese DBB se invloed op 
indiensneming en op die afhanklikheid van die Zambiese staat toon gemengde 
resultate, en dat assesering verskeie Chinese aktiwiteite sal moet ontrafel en ook 
teenstrydigge effekte in gedagte moet hou. 
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CHAPTER ONE: Research Design 
 
 
1.1 Introduction	   	  	  
For developing countries, Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) is an essential form of 
capital mobilisation. It holds potential for increasing employment, infrastructure, and 
providing skills training to its population. Furthermore, FDI gives developing 
countries the opportunity to reduce its reliance on foreign aid, thereby boosting the 
state’s autonomy from donor policies. The potential socio-economic and political 
gains are recognized, and bring much state interest in attracting FDI. Chinese FDI into 
Zambia and other African states has increased steadily over the past decade. However, 
its policies and procedures are scrutinized and questioned to determine whether 
China’s FDI is encouraging development, or merely producing macro-economic 
growth figures, which in itself is not necessarily sustainable. Using the Capability 
Approach Developmental Theory this thesis will evaluate the claims and debates set 
around Chinese FDI and its relevance for development in Zambia. 
 
 
1.2 Preliminary	  Study	  and	  Rationale	  
	  
1.2.2 Literature	  Review	  
The Chinese government worked over the past decade to promote ties and partnership 
with African states through the establishment of the Forum on China-Africa 
Cooperation (FOCAC) (Le Pere & Shelton, 2007: 210; Alden, 2007: 30). FOCAC has 
nine principles to standardise overseas investment required by Chinese owned 
companies that hold their companies to domestic laws and policies intended to 
standardize their work and bring confidence to the states they work in (Ndulo, 2008: 
139). By using new forms of interstate relations the Chinese government’s relations 
with Africa are meant to expand its geopolitical influence for its own future economic 
growth (Le Pere, 2006: 13). While this strategy is explicitly meant to benefit China 
itself, rather than Western approaches to Africa that takes on a more altruistic 
rationale, there is great potential for this partnership to also benefit Africa in regards 
to development according to Le Pere (Le Pere, 2006: 13).  
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China’s Approach to Development and Partnership 
As a developing country, the Chinese government’s policies brought 200 million 
people out of poverty in the 1980s and 1990s. Chinese successes in poverty reduction 
are recognized to be partly due to the US $600 billion invested from foreign 
governments and businesses in the country since 1978. This possibly seems 
emphasizes economic growth’s close ties to FDI (Bernstein, 2010: 250). The Chinese 
government is looking for partnership to secure the growing needs and goals of the 
Chinese economy, and the government is doing so with a similar approach to the one 
that has brought China herself to development. Government policy in Beijing defies 
the notion of a close link between democracy and development. Instead, China is 
rapidly developing, despite still being a semi-authoritarian regime with human rights 
violations (Bernstein, 2010: 7, 250; Mawdsley, 2007: 407).  
 
The Chinese economy’s unprecedented need for natural resources for its rapidly 
growing economy drives its foreign policy (Raine, 2009:36; Vines, 2007: 214). The 
Chinese government’s agenda in Africa is seen to be driven by the desire to gain 
access to key raw materials, consumer market access, and a greater role in 
international politics (Shelton, 2006: 103). The Chinese government is encouraging 
investment in a wide scale of sectors and industries, which is essential for fostering 
private-sector growth in Africa (Alves & Draper, 2006: 23). In its pursuit of South-
South solidarity, China sees and seeks similar trends in Africa to its own development 
path including privatisation, opening up to international trade, and reform based on 
bilateral and multilateral trade agreements. However, it is not focusing on 
democratisation or governance reforms that are often demanded by Western 
institutions (Williams, 2004: 92). 
 
The Chinese government’s alternate approach to partnership with African states is 
founded on basic principles of sovereignty and self-determination. This is (allegedly) 
attractive to many African governments, because it reduces pressure stemming from 
the West’s interference and involvement in domestic matters (Meyeresson et al., 
2008: 2; Miguel & Beuret, 2009: 25). China is finding inroads to Africa 
unprecedented by Western governments or business interests. Due to western avoided 
constraints of expected structural adjustments, accountability, or high standards 
against corruption, or negative anti-colonial sentiments, China is investing at rates 
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inexperienced for many African states (Raine, 2009: 40; Gu & Humphrey, 2007: 5). 
To encourage investment, the FDI of Chinese enterprises is encouraged by the 
Chinese government and complimented with aid and loans, and it has been warmly 
accepted by a number of African governments (Obiorah, 2007: 36 – 39). For these 
developing countries, foreign investment is needed for economic growth, which thus 
far has been largely unavailable from the Western world. Because China is providing 
investment at higher levels and with less interference or supervision of African 
domestic affairs, many African leaders see great potential for development from their 
partnership with China (Bernstein, 2010: 14).  
 
While some analysts are optimistic about the potential positive developmental impacts 
of China’s role in Africa, others are highly critical. A number of observers see 
China’s goals for acquiring natural resources, and for complicit partners in the 
international system to have little interest in reducing levels of corruption or debt, or 
safeguarding human rights and environmental standards. The lack of conditions and 
stipulations, as well as Africa’s (cannot use the word Africa so broadly) own lack of 
planning, are argued to cause further harm, exacerbating these problems (Brautigam, 
2009: 13; Collier, 2007: 86; Wrong Model, Right Continent, 2006; Rocha, 2007: 16). 
Raine (2009:55) observes that China’s approach could be a race to the bottom, 
looking for the lowest standards and responsibilities. This is matched by recognition 
that the expected effects of Chinese FDI including better labour wages, improved 
services, or a correlation between growth and poverty reduction have yet to be seen 
(Van der Lugt et al., 2011: 60). However, for developing states with few options, 
limited by the restrictions of poverty, China is at least offering investments to 
countries needing FDI (Bernstein, 2010: 7, 10; Alves & Draper, 2006: 19). 	  
From an alternate perspective on the role of the state, others argue that it is not 
China’s duty to promote good governance or broad human rights, and that the 
opportunities they bring are valuable for African countries to use to their own interests 
(Taylor, 2009: 171; Hutchison, 1975: 199; Obiorah, 2007: 45). Some see it as 
valuable to the Chinese government’s goals for African states to develop for long term 
stable partnerships, and that Chinese approaches could alter a course towards 
sustainable considerations that would be beneficial to the African states (Alden, 2007: 
5; Michel & Beuret, 2009: 7). Studies and analysis of this FDI-motivated approach to 
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development, as offered to many African states by China differs from traditional 
development models and leaves analysts and states to surmise as to whether these 
trends of economic growth will ultimately translate into development.  
 
Due to the fact that China’s primary motives are thought to be resource-based, the 
most substantial levels of interaction are through (FDI), particularly in resource 
extraction (Davies, 2008:45; Meyersson, Miquel & Qian, 2008:1, Mawdsley, 2007: 
405). China’s partnership and business-focused approach is apparently different from 
the traditional Western approach taken towards African states. With these significant 
partnerships being forged between China and most African countries, many question 
whether it will be relevant to the development of African states (Herman, 2010: 1).  	  
Western governments and international bodies often view Africa as a continent in 
need of help, with disease, poverty, corruption, ethnic division, and conflict as key 
plagues of the continent (Ndulo, 2008: 139). Western responses to the continent is 
formulated on propagated ‘aid’ considerations and (often externally imposed) 
stringent strategies argued to be needed to develop African states. Furthermore, while 
western FDI is limited to many African states, humanitarian concerns and public 
pressure place a demand on investors to operate to Western standards regarding issues 
of human and labour rights, environmental considerations, and with consideration to 
‘uplift’ the states and populations (Gu & Humphrey, 2007: 2; Williams, 2004: 45; 
Thomas, 2004: 188; Ndulo, 2008: 139).  
 
Alternatively, China, a developing country itself, claims to act in a manner of 
partnership for a mutually beneficial situation, it does not shy away from expressing 
that it seeks its own benefits in the cooperation. It claims that through the strategies 
laid out in FOCAC, economic growth and development will come for both sides 
(Michel & Beuret, 2009: 14). Its unique approach with regards to investing in Africa 
bring significant question to whether it will benefit the continent and provide a more 
successful means to development compared to Western approaches. 	  
This strategy for partnership stresses the value of state autonomy and a traditional 
understanding of sovereignty. It thereby claims to allow for states to bring their own 
short and long term interests and plans to the table; China’s growing amounts of FDI, 
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encouraged through packages with aid, operate with the interest of both sides, the 
Chinese government states (Michel & Beuret, 2009: 9). While for many partnering 
African countries China and its global demand for resources stimulate economic 
growth, question remains whether this will translate into sustainable development 
(Grimm, 2011: 20). The task to create the plans, policies, and legislation to maximize 
any benefits and mitigate any risks and make the most of the partnership is arguably 
up to the African states themselves; they are the key responsible actors for 
development (Alves & Draper, 2006:25).  
 
Development is understood as more than basic Gross National Income (GNI) figures, 
and will have to look at sustainable improvement and state capacity building as the 
transition from poverty and dependency, as will be discussed in this study. While a 
more detailed conceptual clarification of both economic growth and development will 
follow in the second chapter, a working definition of development is the improved 
capacity of a society to meet its own needs and sustain economic growth, reducing its 
dependency on other states while improving its own structures and capacity of its 
populace to live autonomous lives (Todaro et al., 2009:14, 18; Prah, 2005: 10; Moss, 
2007:2 Lieten, 2001:105; Schuurman, 2003:5 Morris, 2002:2). Amartya Sen’s 
development theory The Capability Approach outlines critical components that 
development needs to include for it to be actualized and sustainable. These include 
real individual freedoms, resources being transformed into valuable activities, a 
balance of materialistic and non-materialistic factors in human welfare, and the 
distribution of opportunities in society (Sen, 1988; Clark, 2003: 2; Robeyns, 2003: 4). 
Development claims for Chinese FDI in Zambia will be evaluated on the basis of the 
achievement or diminishment of these qualities in this study.  
 
The Case Study of Chinese FDI in Zambia 
Zambia, one of the earliest and highly valued African partner countries of China, 
provides a quality case for study of realized development impacts of FDI (Davies, 
2008:46; Ndulo, 2008: 139). Its copper extraction-based economy has been bringing 
economic growth during the past decade as Chinese FDI has helped to re-open old 
mines and open new mines whilst funding the construction and maintenance of 
infrastructure. An estimate of over 160 Chinese companies work in Zambia, large 
amounts of Chinese products are sold in the country, and there is a growing Chinese 
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immigrant base (Mohan & Tan-Mullins, 2009: 1; Brautigam, 2009: 5). By 2010, the 
Chinese government announced it had invested US $2 billion in Zambia, established 
300 Chinese companies, and employed over 25,000 Zambians (FOCAC, 2011). There 
remains a gap in the literature examining the capacities built and diminished by 
Chinese FDI, and a subsequent analysis of the general development potential beyond 
HDI indicators, which remain limited in their causality. 
 
Zambia is one of the few states that have a lower HDI today than it did in 1970 
(UNDP, 2010a: 16). Its meagre economy has been highly dependent on natural 
resource extraction, influenced strongly by fluctuating markets (UNDP, 2010a: 42; 
Alves & Draper, 2006: 20). The Zambian government plans to use the country’s 
natural resources for economic development to diversify into other economic sectors 
(Zambian Ministry of Finance and National Planning, 2011: 11). China has been 
integral to getting the copper mines and smelters functioning after a decade of disuse, 
which now constitute significant exports (Alden, 2007: 3). China has invested in the 
infrastructure and mining sectors of Zambia, and is increasingly becoming involved in 
other sectors (Rocha, 2007: 22-24). Its involvement is in the forms of FDI supported 
by trade, loans, grants, and aid, which generally come together in packages, as part of 
an organization’s physical financial investment in establishing enterprises in an 
economy other than its own (Van der Lugt et al., 2011: 17).  
 
While China’s aid to Zambia is relatively small, its FDI is paramount to Zambia’s 
current economy, purportedly aimed for Zambia becoming self-reliant (Davies, 
2008:46). The creation of Special Economic Zones for Chinese investment can be 
regarded as an indicator for the country’s long-term involvement (Davies, 2008: 49). 
This can be viewed as a positive sign of commitment, which would indicate a logical 
interest of the Chinese government in seeing development occur in Zambia 
(Bernstein, 2010: 2). However, parts of Zambian society have not always looked 
favourably towards Chinese involvement. Protests and viable political opponents have 
challenged the government’s allowance of low labour standards, intense competition 
hurting the domestic manufacturing sector, immigration, and high (allegedly unfair) 
competition in the market caused by Chinese FDI (Taylor, 2009: 169). Nonetheless, 
Chinese investment has continued to come, and the Zambian government continues to 
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support and condone Chinese FDI. 1The University of Zambia (UNZA) completed a 
study in April 2011 concluding that Chinese FDI in Zambia was conducive to 
development (Centre for Chinese Studies, 2011: 12). Beyond this reporting by the 
Centre for Chinese Studies on the study, however, the UNZA paper itself was 
unavailable.  
 
The Chinese partnership does impact on the social, economic, and political spheres, 
including elements like training professionals, constructing hospitals, and schools, and 
state buildings (Manji & Marks, 2006: 2). Nevertheless, as development benefits have 
yet to be realized from economic growth, there is uncertainty as to whether Zambia 
will be able to develop from the relative economic prosperity it is currently 
experiencing and what future course should be charted by the Zambian government in 
regards to Chinese partnership (Van der Lugt et al., 2011: 60). For development to be 
recognized it will require Zambia to take proactive steps towards consolidated 
planning, political change and economic adjustment (Alves & Draper, 2006: 24).  
 
 
The Role of FDI in Development Processes 
Economic growth is necessary, but is not a sufficient precondition for development on 
its own. The Chinese government is said to be interested primarily in Africa’s natural 
resources to fuel China’s own economy. For African states, exporting natural 
resources is shown to have short-term positive effects on economic growth 
(Meyersson et al., 2008: 19). However, FDI is discussed as only leading to economic 
growth if FDI inflows are managed well to encourage further growth (Van der Lugt et 
al., 2011: 20). There is also a risk of a resource curse, where dependence on natural 
resources for a large percentage of a state’s GDP results in inflation, which restricts 
other economic sectors (Alves et al., 2006: 26; Rocha, 2007: 31). While economic 
growth does not need to correlate with improvements in health and education, it is still 
an essential precursor for development to take place (Bernstein, 2010: 275; UNDP, 
2010a: 17). This opens up the possibility that Africa’s natural resources could be 
                                                1	  Recently	  elected	  President	  Michael	  Sata	  comes	  with	  a	  stance	  of	  planned	  control	  over	  Chinese	  investment.	  In	  a	  speech	  with	  the	  Chinese	  ambassador,	  Zhao,	  Yuxiao,	  emphasized	  that	  Chinese	  companies	  would	  not	  be	  getting	  preferential	  treatment	  (News24,	  26	  September	  2011,	  Obey	  rules:	  
Zambia	  tells	  China)	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essential for fighting poverty and underdevelopment of states, though cannot be 
assumed on their own to show development within a state (Rocha, 2007: 30).  	  
Beyond economic growth, development is understood as a reduction of inequality that 
would lead to eradicate poverty (Todaro & Smith, 2009: 16). Development is about 
sustainable social, economic, and people-centered capacity building while improving 
the circumstances of large numbers of people to remove dependency from others for 
the basic welfare and capacity of the state (Brautigam, 2009: 11; Bernstein, 2010: 
260; UNDP, 2010A: 19). Economic growth from FDI can play a significant role in 
this. Furthermore, when political and social conditions are adequate, societal progress 
and development can follow (Bernstein, 2010: 250).  	  
FDI has a role in development. International companies can create innovation, 
employment, training, and other social benefits making them potential key actors in 
development. This makes them a viable alternative to traditional aid strategies 
(Bernstein, 2010: 12). However, in cases of resource exploitation, companies are 
given a bare minimum focus of extraction until depletion, which negates development 
in its process. It is here where government regulation is essential for creating 
economic diversification and quality labour expansion through this form of FDI. Aid 
in Africa, on the other hand, is argued to be the least effective in the world, and 
unsustainable. Few projects remain operational after aid is terminated (Williams, 
2004: 55). With the (critical) debate on aid’s ineffectiveness there is greater interest 
and need to see what FDI can achieve. 	  
The relevance of FDI can be seen within the socio-economic and political spheres of a 
state. With regards to socio-economic indicators, FDI can encourage economic 
growth by adding capital and business investment into the host economy (Moyo, 
2008: 47; Todaro et al., 2009: 16). Secondly, FDI focused within construction can 
advance infrastructure expansions within a state. These provide capacity for further 
economic growth and potential for better delivery of critical infrastructure to a 
population (Broadman, 2007: 2; Davies, 2008: 48). Thirdly, economic diversification 
is critical to move states away from reliance on raw resources for their survival and 
removal from dependence due to the vitality of prices, and limited employment 
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opportunities created (Meyerrson et al., 2008: 19). Finally, in terms of employment, 
the capacity for FDI to employ locals, training them and investing in companies, 
transferring skills and knowledge makes it relevant for a country’s development. 
Employment figures alone however do not indicate development, as labour 
exploitation may occur from firms disinterested in a more educated workforce 
(UNDP, 2010a: 17). 
 
FDI is relevant to development within the political sphere in several key areas. With 
potential increase in a state’s budget through taxes, FDI can increase the national 
budget with potential for reducing the host’s debt and reliance on foreign aid (Moyo, 
2008: 47). Depending on how foreign investors operate within the legal framework of 
the country can come into play with issues of state transparency and corruption. 
Whether or not investors uphold domestic laws, or alternately utilize methods of graft 
to maintain their operations matters to the domestic governance system they are 
operating within (TI: 2007: 1-4). The strength of institutions is critical for the creating 
and upholding legislature essential to strengthen the state structure to encourage 
further foreign and local enterprise through the provision of legislation and regulation, 
guarding the interests and rights of corporations and their locally employed labour 
(UNDP, 2010a: 19; Mwanawina, 2008:5). It is essential that a country’s leadership 
and institutions ensure that economic growth and investments serve the populace, 
strengthen institutions, and take profits to invest in the state’s future and accumulated 
capacity (TI, 2007: 1-4; Zambian Ministry of Finance and Planning, 2011: 10; Todaro 
& Smith, 2009: 15, 23).  
 
1.2.2 Problem	  Statement	  
Chinese FDI is significant for Zambia’s economy, most notably in intense mineral 
extraction. While indices show this to be having an influence on economic growth 
patterns, it is yet to be seen whether Zambia’s economic growth will actualize into 
development.  
 
This thesis asks the question what is the relevance of Chinese FDI to Zambian 
development? This question will explore the relationship of how FDI influences 
Zambia through key socio-economic and political indicators as explored through 
current debate and assessed through a developmental Capability Approach lens. As 
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such it will explore the current academic debate around this topic, critically evaluating 
the strength of arguments on both sides. It will utilize national trends as a context for 
the argument. Looking into the relevance of FDI for development will also require us 
to clarify the question of how is FDI relevant to development? This question will be 
examined from a theoretical approach, identifying key socio-economic and political 
indicators relevant to both FDI and development in light of the tenets of Sen’s 
Capability Approach theory of development. These indicators will be assessed from 
arguments made by researchers, analysts, government officials and institutions 
relevant to the debate. From this, the current state of research on the indicators will be 
evaluated as to their substantiation of claims regarding their conduciveness to 
development and regarding the current discussion on Chinese impact on each of the 
indicators. 
 
 
1.2.2 Contribution	  to	  Field	  
The aim of this study is to assess the debate around the relevance of Chinese FDI on 
national development in the case study of Zambia. Chinese FDI is increasing 
substantially in Africa. The effects of this increase, however, remains controversial 
amongst analysts who cite possible risks and benefits for recipient countries due to the 
distinct nature of Chinese FDI in comparison to traditional Western approaches to 
developing states. At present there are only economic growth guidelines and 
speculative attitudes to evaluate impacts of Chinese FDI on development. This study 
aims to contribute to the study by critically evaluating the arguments made within key 
socio-economic and political indicators. This is to disaggregate the debate before 
collectively (re) integrating the components for a summative analysis of the relevance 
of these indicators used, and the substantiation of argument indicating overall levels 
of conduciveness. For this exploratory qualitative study, data will be collected through 
a variety of primary and secondary sources, articles, reports, and documents focused 
on Zambia, China, and the larger contexts of each within their relations to Africa. The 
case study of Zambia is one of the best documented in Africa making it a prime case 
to review.  
 
 
1.3 Research	  Design	  
 
1.3.1 Research Design and Research Methodology 
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This study will evaluate the relevance that Chinese FDI has towards development in 
Zambia through four key socio-economic factors, and three political factors.  These 
factors align FDI to development capacity, and are able to offer insight into the 
categories established by Sen in The Capability Approach theory to development 
(Clark, 2003: 3). Within each factor, a general diagnostic of Zambia will be reviewed, 
followed by available reports, claims, and evidence that give context to 
conceptualizing the influences that Chinese FDI have on each factor.  These indicators 
need to be understood and valued individually. This thesis will not provide sweeping 
conclusions on whether Chinese FDI is conducive for Zambian development. Rather, 
the factors will be broken into the two categories of socioeconomic indicators and 
political indicators. Socio-economic indicators to be studied are economic growth, 
infrastructure expansion, market diversification, and labour and employment. Political 
indicators to be studied are political dependency, transparency and corruption, and 
strength of institutions.   
 
Data sources for this study will come from a conglomerate of sources including 
national statistics, government and intergovernmental reports. This thesis still 
provides value in offering a critical evaluation of the influence of Chinese FDI on 
Zambia’s development through the critical lens of The Capability Approach. It offers 
insight and analysis to the claims made on all sides, structuring and evaluating the 
debate. 
 
 
1.3.2 Limitations	  and	  Delimitations	  
This study is complicated by the fact it requires data from multiple fields over a ten-
year period. As Zambia has been studied more extensively in regards to its 
development and relations with China, there is a wide range of data and debate 
surrounding this issue. Deliberation has also been taken in selecting relevant variables 
that can be researched as offer relevant insight into the field of study. The use of 
Capability Approach theory also is limited in that it does not provide a clear 
framework for variables in assessing development through its lens. However, the 
relevant theoretical grounding it provides gives flexibility to the adopting of the 
relevant indicators used in this study, making it a valuable tool in critiquing the 
information presented through debate and national development indicators. 
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This study is also limited in that it cannot offer final conclusions about the benefits or 
costs brought to Zambian development by Chinese FDI. As links of unequivocal 
causality cannot be established between FDI and overall country development, this 
study was required to look at the debate around potential trends and conduciveness 
provided. This study has required finding some linking aspects between the two, and 
is limited to providing observations about the discussion on the conduciveness of 
Chinese FDI for encouraging development.  
	  
 While reviewing the debate, this study did not utilize in-field research and can thus 
not make contributions to broadening the empirical basis of our understanding of 
discussed effects. This study does not intend to fill the lack of up to date and 
accessible data available. Rather, its aim was to identify the conclusiveness or 
otherwise of a debate that is ongoing and thereby provides indications of where 
further research would be needed.  
 
1.3.3 Chapter	  Overview	  
This first chapter serves as an introduction to the study of the relevance of FDI to 
development, and the value of the case study of Chinese FDI in Zambia. The problem 
statement and the significance of this study are also addressed in chapter one. This 
chapter also offered the literary review, which shows gaps in the critical determination 
of the relevance of Chinese FDI to Zambian development in light of The Capability 
Approach Theory of development. Chapter Two will deal with conceptualisation and 
operationalization of the terms used in this study, and a theoretical approach to the 
key variables of the socio-economic and political indicators that will be utilized. It 
will also break down Sen’s Capability Approach theory to development. Chapter 
Three will provide the context of Zambian development, the Chinese approach FDI 
within partnership, and its context within traditional western FDI and involvement in 
Zambia. Chapter Four will then breakdown the debate within each socio-economic 
and political. This will lead to Chapter Five, which will review the findings and 
evaluate their relevance, offer concluding remarks. 
 
 
1.4 Conclusion 
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With the increase of Chinese FDI into Zambia, it is important to study its relevance to 
development. Gaps in the literature show that despite much argumentation on both 
sides regarding the costs and benefits received by Zambia through partnership with 
China, there remains dispute regarding how to fully measure and evaluate the socio-
economic and political influences it has. Using Sen’s Capability Approach this thesis 
aims to assess and evaluate the debate.  
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CHAPTER TWO: Theoretical Approach 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter deals with the conceptualisation of terms used throughout the study. It 
also reviews the approach taken to establish the theoretical base and relevance of FDI 
to development. The terms to be conceptualized include ‘FDI’, ‘development’, 
‘developing country’, and ‘economic growth’. It will also break down the indicators 
to be focused on in this study, arranged in socio-economic and political categories. 
These will then be discussed in light of development Capability Approach theory. 
This chapter will conclude with an explanation of some key theoretical and 
methodological challenges faced in the study.  
 
 
2.2 Key Conceptualizations 
 
Conceptualizations of the key terms in this study provide more than a definition. They 
will explain the characteristics and operationalize socio-economic and political 
indicators of development and thereby contextualise the academic debate on 
development. This will allow establishing the indicators to better recognize and 
analyse the case study found in Chapter Four.  
 
2.2.1 Foreign Direct Investment 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) is conceptualized as the investments made within a 
state by foreign actors, whether private or state-run (Todaro & Smith, 2009: 824). 
Unlike portfolio investments, FDI goes beyond taking a stake in an enterprise, but 
rather including direct interest in its management. Because it requires an investment 
and expansion in corporations within a new state it is more than a basic flow of capital 
(Gallagher et al., 2005:16). Since FDI assumes that Multi-National Corporations 
(MNCs) invest in the host country with long-term objectives and strategies, it is 
assumed to be less volatile than portfolio investment, and presumably has interest in 
seeing the state’s markets succeed.  
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For this reason, FDI is recognized to have a unique set of potential benefits to a 
country and can contribute to its development (Chudnovsky et al., 2007:74). It can 
enhance the international competitiveness of the host country by introducing or 
reinforcing local competition, provide jobs, technology, and finance. While MNCs 
involved in FDI focus on profits, states are interested in larger economic goals beyond 
mere GNI growth. Arguing normatively, their focus should be in the interest of 
maximizing the welfare of their citizens (Chudnovsky et al., 2007:74). FDI cannot be 
assumed to always have positive implications for a state. As potential costs, FDI may 
lead to an outcompeting effect, in other words as an effect decrease local employment, 
focus itself into one basic sector such as mineral extraction with too high of risks. 
Alternatively lacking skilled workers and infrastructure for manufacturing or service 
exacerbates the challenges. FDI is relevant to socioeconomic and political 
development, as it offers tools and funds to both sectors that are required for 
developmental purposes. Subsequent to these funds, there are also subsequent 
policies, partnerships, and trade agreements that will influence the state (Zarsky, 
2005: 5; Schuurman, 2003: 106).  
 
 2.2.2 Economic Growth 
Economic Growth is conceptualized as the increase in value of the total economic 
activities within a state. It is measured by economic indicators including GNI, levels 
of trade, and government surpluses (Chudnovsky et al., 2007:101). It is distinguished 
from development based on its critical influence on internal and external factors. 
These include markets, investment, and support from state and non-state actors and its 
irrelevance to impact on the populace or state sustainability. It is an important factor 
and support for state development. While economic growth is not always sustainable, 
it is an essential precursor to development according to Zarsky (or some other 
qualification) (Zarsky, 2005:1).  
 
2.2.3 Development 
There is no overall consensus on what ‘development’ means (Moss, 2007:2). The 
generation and sustenance of an annual increase of Gross National Income (GNI) at 
rates of five to seven per cent by a national economy with an initial more or less static 
economic condition traditionally defined development (Todaro et al., 2009:14). This 
early definition aligns quite closely to present understandings of economic growth. 
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Since the 1950s, it has been built upon to include the larger realities of development 
that extend beyond this definition (Goklany, 2002:21; Andreasson, 2010:4) and to 
incorporate the more holistic process of changing social and economic, structures and 
national institutions (Todaro et al., 2009:14; Prah, 2005: 10). These structural changes 
are to work alongside an acceleration of economic growth, the reduction of inequality, 
and the eradication of poverty. A narrow definition of raising incomes to make people 
less poor is inadequate because of its overlooking of the context development is 
situated in (Moss, 2007:2). This narrow definition only encapsulates one precursor to 
development; economic growth.  
 
Economic growth will not necessarily translate into development, depending on its 
interrelation with a number of socio-economic and political factors within the host 
state (Todaro & Smith, 2009: 18; Lieten, 2001:105). As both domestic and foreign 
investment within itself does not necessarily support sustainability and equity, signs 
of economic growth in a country cannot automatically be linked to development. GNI 
indicators therefore do not serve as a sufficient or adequate measure of development. 
As economic growth is not synonymous with development, its indicators are unique to 
those of development (Andreasson, 2010:4). While economic growth can occur 
without development, the reverse is unlikely. Economic growth is still seen as 
essential for development, even if it not sufficient on its own (World Bank, 2000:15). 
Development is more than financial inflow. Growing levels of national income might 
allow for but do not necessitate improvements in health, education, or a reduction of 
national poverty (Goklany, 2002:21). Nor do they necessarily precede improvements 
in governance, or in national capacity for sustenance of growth. Thus it is important to 
note that there is a differentiation between development and economic growth.  
 
Development is a broader concept for the overall improvement of the lives of the 
poorer population groups in a country. The Human Development Index (HDI), 
developed by the UN encapsulates the education, and health of a population alongside 
its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita (Moss, 2007:2). An even further 
expanded conceptualization of development however, requires consideration of the 
conditions within development needs to take place. This conceptualization gives 
insight into the issues causing the lack of development, rather than just citing key 
indicators. Development does not occur from a neutral starting line (Schuurman, 
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2003:5). States experiencing high levels of poverty and absence of development are 
recognized to be working to develop from a place of ‘underdevelopment’ or a 
‘poverty trap’ (Cheru et al., 2005: 11; World Bank, 2000:12). These two terms both 
indicate an underlying disadvantage and larger context needing to be addressed by 
development.  
 
The poverty trap experienced by most lesser developed countries (LDCs) very 
commonly include the interrelated issues of high levels of absolute poverty, hunger, 
unemployment, lack of education, gender inequality, and disease (Bloom et al., 2007: 
105-106). Elements that further exacerbate the poverty trap are identified as low 
savings, low tax, low foreign investment, lack of infrastructure, violence, debt, 
reliance on aid, brain drain, poor governance, rapid population growth and 
environmental degradation (Nwonwu, 2008: 13). These poverty traps explain that 
developmental programmes must work to address the interconnectivity of a multitude 
of issues. This broad approach is essential for a country to gain capacity to support 
itself.  
 
Development is conceptualized here as the improved capacity of a state to meet the 
needs of its population and continue economic growth in its territory, reducing its 
dependency on other states while improving its own structures and capacity of its 
populace to live autonomous sustainable lives. This definition encapsulates the 
empowerment of the socio-economic, and political sectors to gain the capacity to 
address the larger set of needs and issues of the state. Sustainability refers to the 
ability to meet the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future 
generations to meet their own needs (Morris, 2002:2).  
 
2.2.4 Developing Countries  
With a comprehension of development, it is important to understand the general pre-
existing conditions of a state seeking higher levels of development. Developing 
countries are conceptualized here as those that come from a state of poverty with 
general disadvantage in the international system needing to find means to sustain 
growth and development to gain capacity to meet their own needs (Todaro & Smith, 
2009: 16). It is important to note that a developing state is not one that is necessarily 
achieving development or even economic growth. Instead it refers to a state faced by a 
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number of the aforementioned developmental issues, without the capacity to 
adequately address them.  
 
Impeded by poverty traps and underdevelopment, developing states require 
extenuating circumstance to move, which require economic growth either through aid, 
investment, or the exploitation of natural resources (Lieten, 2001: 12-13). The context 
of states working towards development requires the coordination of socio-economic 
and political factors that together can utilize economic growth. In this sense, FDI, 
though not as directly aligned in purpose to development as aid, can play a pivotal 
role towards development (Van der Lugt, et al., 2011:5).  
 
However, while providing economic growth, if the state’s actors and process overlook 
or negate the required socio-economic and political features of a country, 
development efforts can be overturned. The impacts to be had by FDI are largely in 
the hands of the state’s government, responsible for managing FDI (through 
regulation and/or incentives) to the benefit of the country. However, these can be 
limited in light of international competition and externally imposed requirements. The 
result of this would be to leave the state with little developmental progress. If 
structural changes and the framework conditions are not adequately addressed, FDI 
could further leave the state with similar levels of dependency on aid, FDI, and 
natural resources. In that case, economic growth would remain unsustainable and 
society would not necessarily benefit from the FDI, nor would the economy 
necessarily diversify. As developing states are vastly different they should not be 
clumped as one. Nonetheless, there are general trends present that should be 
recognized (Schuurman, 2003:11).  
 
Socially, a developing state is one reliant on low wage employment at basic tasks 
requiring minimal training, reflected in lower levels of education, often matched with 
gender inequality. These issues of poverty increase susceptibility to its markets 
remain small, with domestic corporations (Prah, 2005:8). Development needs to 
address a multitude of issues including levels of unemployment, and provision of 
social services so that a community can gain the skills to enhance its own markets and 
begin to address its own issues sustainably (Lieten, 2001:110).  
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Economically, developing states have some overlapping similarities. Developing 
states often rely on unprocessed foods and natural resources for export whether oil, 
minerals, timber, crops, or other raw resources as the major commodity. With these 
commodities, state authorities in developing countries plan on contributing to 
economic growth and national development plans through international support or 
partnership, trade and/or aid in order to subsequently gain more autonomy (World 
Bank, 2000:10-12). Lacking infrastructure can remain a barrier to efficiency and 
investment. For development in the broader sense as defined above, market 
diversification is essential along with the improvement of infrastructure to make the 
economy more competitive, and a producer of higher product goods, which is 
essential for improving the autonomy and sustainability of the state’s economic 
growth (Lieter, 2001:99; Chudnovsky et al., 2007:74).  
 
Politically a developing state is understood to be working towards the autonomy and 
capacity to govern whilst providing services for its citizens. It is also to be aspiring 
towards creating the framework conditions and structures necessary to produce 
conditions that are conducive for development. Often governments operate with 
relatively high levels corruption and graft, limiting the effectiveness of the state and, 
in fact, thereby questioning the goal of servicing the people (Prah, 2005:14). A state’s 
reliance on aid, foreign investment and debt obligations can leave it limited in its 
capacity to handle its own affairs. With limited capacity to address the socio-
economic challenges facing the state, the governance of a developing state is pressed 
to offer what is needed (Chudnovsky, 2007:75). For sustainable development to be 
realized in the socio-economic factors, in other words inducing structural change 
instead of rent-seeking behaviour, the state needs to become transparent, challenging 
graft, while establishing its own clear socio-economic policies (Morris, 2002:2). It 
further needs to strengthen its institutions to keep all levels of the state and foreign 
investors accountable to the direction needing to be taken.  
 
 
2.3 FDI and Capability Approach Developmental Theory 
 
Most theories of development emphasize and measure growth by indicators of wealth, 
health, employment, or literacy. Sen’s theory of Capability Approach emerged as a 
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leading alternative to standardized frameworks used to measure development. In 
distinguishing between other theories of development, Capability Approach looks at 
the overall enhancing of functioning capacity of society (Sen, 1988: 8; Todaro et al., 
2009: 17). Instead of seeing a population as a means to development, it also looks at 
them as ends to any progress (Clark, 2003: 6). One of the key strengths of this 
framework is its flexibility and how it allows for researchers to develop and apply it in 
many different ways (Clark, 2003: 5). As such, Sen does not put forth specific 
categories that need to be discussed and established as ‘objectively correct’. It is 
meant to be used to study the larger structures and trends set in place that are relevant 
to the capabilities of the population and government. In this, there is relevance for 
utilizing this theory in assessing the overall trends set in the aforementioned factors in 
their regards to development (Clark, 2003: 5).   
 
The theory is critiqued because of its lacking a framework with coherent set of 
capabilities. However, it can be defended on the grounds that there are no set 
characteristics that can go into defining development. To address this, in this thesis, 
key socioeconomic and political factors are selected in which Sen’s broader 
components to development can be evaluated. Firstly is the importance of real 
freedoms, which is understood through their capabilities to make choices with 
autonomy. Secondly is the ability to transform resources into valuable activities. 
Thirdly Sen looks for a balance of the materialistic and non-materialistic factors 
surrounding human welfare. Finally, the concern for the distribution of opportunities 
within society is addressed. All of these are pertain in various lights to the socio-
economic and political factors that will be studied in China’s relationship through FDI 
with Zambia. Overall, this development theory evaluates policies and practices 
according to their impact on people’s capabilities (Robeyns, 2003: 7). FDI will be 
analysed in its role as an ‘Agent’, in terms of the capabilities it provides change to the 
capabilities and functioning’s of the Zambian population and government in achieving 
development. The capabilities of individual citizens will be evaluated in the socio-
economic sphere, and the capabilities of the Zambian government in the political 
sphere.  
 
2.4 The Relevance of External Actors to Development 
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Aid exists as an attempt to contribute to development in Africa through donated funds 
(Moss, 2007:117). In order to prevent, or at least reduce rent-seeking behaviour, aid is 
usually tied directly to the fight against global poverty and its numerous surrounding 
issues (hence the use of so-called ‘conditionalities’). For numerous developing 
countries, particularly in Africa, aid is the largest single source of state financing 
(Moss, 2007:117). As aid focuses directly on socio-economic issues in development, 
its indicators and measurements can be linked directly to broader development 
challenges. The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) are the primary 
international focus of foreign developmental aid. They are focused on key targets in 
poverty reduction, health, gender equality, education, and environmental 
sustainability to be met by 2015 (UN Millennium Project, 2005; World Bank, 
2000:14). Health, education, income, infrastructure, and levels of democracy are each 
measurable and can be used to reflect the impact of aid projects. 
 
Arguably, and similar to the directly established link between aid and development, 
FDI can be directly linked to economic growth. Financial flows coming with FDI are 
immediately linked to some macro-economic indicators. Indicators of economic 
growth remain straightforward due to its direct linkage and measurement through 
GNI, GDP per capita, taxation, employment, and levels of investment (Goklany, 
2002:21). However, FDI cannot be linked as immediately to development. In regards 
to FDI, levels of its developmental impact cannot be based upon the same indicators 
for development as used by aid. The implications for a country’s FDI within a 
developing state cannot be joined directly to levels of health or education; the line of 
causality is actually more indirect and thus longer. Absolute figures of employment 
created through a certain investment activity can be measured against the size of 
overall employment. Yet, this cannot be used to judge whether the overall impact on 
development is positive or not, as other factors interfere in the longer chain of 
causality of FDI’s effect on development.  
 
The purpose of FDI differs from aid, in the sense that the intent of its key actors is to 
increase profit through the expansion of markets into new countries. Though the 
impacts had on a state’s development are secondary, it does not mean that FDI cannot 
have a significant impact on a state’s development (Olukoshi, 2009:9). For this 
reason, specific linkages need to be determined between development and FDI in 
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order to study the relevant trends, figures, and qualitative reports to determine the 
nature of a relationship of a state’s FDI in another.  
 
 
2.5 Framework and Indicators: Relevant Connections between FDI and 
Development 
 
FDI on its own accord does not directly influence the capacities of a populace directly 
in many of the areas recognized to improve the lives of citizens as traditional aid 
efforts may or may not at least aspire to. This study needs to assess the critical areas 
that FDI does have a relevant influence in, specifically areas and structures 
established for state development that would in turn be used for development 
measures in the more traditional sense of health, education, and GDP per capita 
(Zarsky, 2005:2). While FDI does not have an immediate, direct connection to key 
indicators of development, such as those utilized by the MDGs or by the Human 
Development Index (HDI), its connection to a host state goes beyond mere economic 
growth. FDI does impact a state’s development trajectory at the socio-economic and 
political levels and it thus does have the potential for either contributing to actualizing 
development or doing harm to developmental efforts (Olukoshi, 2009:10; 
Chudnovsky et al., 2007:75-76). However, it remains difficult to make quantitative 
conclusions about the influence FDI may have on a state’s development 
(Chudnovsky, et al., 2007: 101). The analysis will need to be broken down to a more 
manageable and smaller range of indicators.  
 
This study namely looks at FDI’s influence on labour/employment, economic 
diversification, and improved governance as the critical areas where FDI can be 
channelled beyond offering just economic growth, and rather contributes to achieving 
sustainable development. That said, a study around key areas that FDI is recognized to 
have an impact under these three variables will give insight into the overall influence 
and trends FDI is having upon a developing state. Table 2.1 overviews the key factors 
under each sector that link between both FDI and development. By assessing these 
factors with available qualitative and quantitative data, conclusions can be drawn on 
the effects that FDI has on key elements of development. An analysis of each factor 
will utilize available data from a ten-year period to review the trends in each factor, to 
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provide indicators for the influence in FDI. As Chinese FDI in Zambia has risen 
dramatically since 2000, this should offer insight into the relevance of Chinese FDI 
for Zambian development.  
 
Table 2.1 Breakdown of Indicators relating FDI to Development 
Socio- Economic Indicators Political Indicators 
• Economic Growth 
• Infrastructure Expansion 
• Market Diversification 
• Labour and Employment 
• Dependency  
• Transparency and 
Corruption 
• Strength of Institutions 
 (Source: own compilation, based on arguments developed in Zarsky, 2005:2; Chudnovsky et al., 2007: 
95; World Bank, 2000:2; Lieten, 2001:106; Agosin, 2007:43; Krugmann, 1995:136; Prah, 2005:14; 
Mugabe, 2005:77-78; Moss, 2007: 8; Afoku, 2005:24-25) 
 
 2.5.1 Socio-economic Indicators 
The influence of FDI can be particularly felt by specific sectors of society. 
Particularly those employed by MNCs, the standards of labour and treatment they 
employ, and the potential of skills and technology all have a transformative power 
within society (Lieten, 2001:105). These factors have the potential for empowering a 
workforce for enhancing domestic firms with capacity for improvement, and the 
uplifting of those employed, substantiating development at the social level. However, 
MNCs also have the capacity to offer poor working conditions, little or no opportunity 
for transference of skills, and can rely on immigrant labour rather than develop skills 
in the national work force (Zarsky, 2005:2). This potential influence may have 
positive results in some areas, with mixed, negative or inconclusive results in others. 
Socio-economic relevance will be analysed through four key indicators in this study:  
a. Economic growth,  
b. Infrastructure expansion,  
c. Market diversification, and  
d. Employment  
will be studied through both qualitative reports and figures for analysis (Agosin, 
2007:43; Chudnovsky, 2007:95).  
 
 Economic Growth 
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While economic growth is a central factor considered for a state to encourage FDI, 
there are additional critical economic implications that need to be considered. As 
discussed earlier, economic growth alone cannot assume to bring about or even propel 
development on its own. Sound economic foundations need to be established for any 
growth to convert into development (World Bank, 2000: 51). As an initial gauge of 
the country’s economic direction, analysis of trends of economic growth is measured 
GDP and GDP per capita. Economic growth provides the necessary, even if not 
sufficient basis for the remaining socio-economic factors (Chudnovsky et al., 
2007:101). Investment is acknowledged to be the driving force behind economic 
growth, with great relevance attached to the linkage between FDI and economic 
growth (Lieten, 2001:107).   
  
Infrastructure Expansion 
Infrastructure in developing states generally remains a detriment to development 
(World Bank, 2000:4). FDI and growth can be delayed or obstructed by degraded or 
lacking infrastructure, such as roads, electricity, water, and communication systems 
(World Bank, 2000: 17). Investment in infrastructure – physical, financial, and 
information – is essential for development, and is tied to FDI both in terms of 
attracting investments, and in the potential infrastructure they will bring into the 
country (World Bank, 2000: 28). While FDI does not necessarily involve 
infrastructure expansion, this remains a moderately relevant indicator, and the 
relevance of Chinese FDI for infrastructure expansion in Zambia will need to be 
looked at more closely as it pertains to the capabilities of society’s economic activity. 
 
Market Diversification 
For developing states reliant on natural resources or raw materials, FDI can either 
further cement its economic dependence on these resources or it can foster economic 
diversification. Economic diversification entails the market expansion into broader 
manufacturing and service sectors, while increasing the value added of traditional 
exports (Krugmann, 1995:136). This step is critical for sustainable development to 
occur making it a highly relevant indicator. It can produce an economy that is able to 
produce higher quality goods, rather than raw materials. This structural change would 
lead to a reduction of international dependence (including on aid, and it might 
increase traded values) thereby giving the state the capacity to better meet its own 
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needs (Chudnovsky, et al. 2007:95). The diversification effects or otherwise of FDI, 
particularly from China, will be reviewed in this indicator as it pertains to capabilities 
for a diversified market and is measured through economic sector trends.  
 
Employment  
FDI may result in an increase of domestic jobs, competing with the foreign MNCs 
(World Bank, 2000:2). For developing countries with large proportions of the 
populace engaged in small-scale agriculture, FDI has the potential to undermine 
livelihoods and bring migration to urban areas without providing the needed 
employment (Zarsky, 2005:4). It may also result in outcompeting (nascent) industries 
and thereby reduce pre-existing domestic jobs. Through intense competition and an 
influx of immigration, official or otherwise, FDI may have negative implications for a 
state’s domestic labour (Chudnovsky et al., 2007: 95). Analysis beyond numbers can 
explore the value added from employment including the transfer of skills and 
technology and influence on the competition of domestic markets. For developing 
countries, MNCs can provide technology, and skills that are lacking domestically, 
which will stimulate industry growth (Lieten, 2001:106; Zarsky, 2005: 1; Chudnovsky 
et al., 2007:95). Skills provided include managerial skills, and technical training. For 
developing countries, training its populace is essential for the strengthening of its 
workforce’s capabilities and capacity and a highly relevant indicator within the study 
(World Bank, 2000: 27). It will thus need to be explored if a linkage between Chinese 
FDI and one of the described effects can be established for Zambia.  
 
2.5.2 Political Indicators  
A central determinant for how socio-economic factors play out in regards to FDI is 
based on domestic political influence. Regulated governance of FDI for developing 
countries began in the 1990s, as a measure to safeguard sustainability and 
development (Agosin et al., 2007:4). As reflected in the discussion above, the 
capacity for FDI to translate to development requires political intention. This can be 
analysed through several political indicators that all illuminate a government’s ability 
to coordinate its efforts for the needs and interests of its citizens through 
comprehensive strategies for development, and capacity to follow that plan (World 
Bank, 2000: 64). Key indicators to review are  
a. Trends of state economic dependency,  
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b. Corruption and transparency, and  
c. Strength of institutions (Araya, 2005:62; Zarsky, 2005:4-5).  
 
It is important to note that national indicators for these factors can only provide 
context for this study. The relevance of a particular state as a source of FDI would be 
only one of many contributing influences on each of these factors and cannot be given 
credit for the overall direction being taken by a state in any one of these areas. 
Instead, national trends must be recognized in light of specific reports and case studies 
relevant to each indicator as available. Capability Approach theory pertains to the 
overall capacity of government to work autonomously, and effectively, at addressing 
the needs of the state.  
 
State Economic Dependence 
Both national debt and reliance on aid further a developing country’s government’s 
limitation to directing its own developmental course. Governments of developing 
states become reliant on aid, being one of the significant detriments of aid-based 
development strategies (Prah, 2005:14). FDI has the potential to reduce dependence, 
bringing about autonomy of the state to be more selective with its partnerships and 
impositions of foreign states or bodies on their development strategies (Lieten, 
2001:102; World Bank, 2000:5). Aid and debt minimize government control over a 
budget. Overall levels of aid are funded by numerous donors, often coming with 
fragmented projects and requirements that can weaken a state’s institutional capacity 
(World Bank, 2000:25). Debt also potentially leaves to dependence on external 
assistance that can come with a development agenda set by donors, as recognized in 
the great impediments to development left by the IMF’s Structural Adjustment 
Policies (SAPs) (Chudnovsky, et al. 2007:94). FDI is not as intimately tied to this 
indicator; FDI does not lead to debts, but might come only in some sectors and not in 
others. Positively speaking, FDI might provide funding beyond aid and thereby reduce 
dependencies. This study will look at the receiving state’s ability to move from 
dependency of aid and loans, as influenced by the foreign state investments (Mugabe, 
2005:77-78).  
 
Transparency and Corruption 
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Levels of corruption in a state can be highly detrimental to development through the 
deference of funds from proper allocation, and the ability for those with power or 
money to work around the laws intended to bring about development. If MNCs 
attempt to use corrupt channels it can overthrow government efforts for socio-
economic development, making it a pertinent factor to be considered in the impacts of 
FDI on development. Levels of corruption also translate into decline of the rule of law 
and transparency (World Bank, 2000: 64; Moss, 2007: 8). This factor will utilize the 
indicators and reports from Transparency International (TI) to gage levels of 
corruption throughout the state. Furthermore it will need to rely on reports of graft and 
court cases to discern whether the FDI from a particular state – and our interest here is 
focused on China – is having any influence on graft within the recipient country. 
Similar to state economic dependence, this indicator is limited in its correlation to 
development and is determined to be moderately relevant. 
 
Strength of Institutions 
The strength of institutions looks at a government’s ability to respond to new demands 
by building capacity, and empowering citizens (World Bank, 2000: 64). The 
capability of a government to meet the demands of its citizens through key institutions 
including the judiciary, the bureaucracy, and as a platform for open discussion all can 
be measured to indicate the direction of a state’s development (Afoku, 2005:24-25; 
Chudnovsky et al., 2007:74l; TI, 2007: 1-4). Furthermore the policies of a state need 
to offer a comprehensive direction for development, offering socio-economic 
direction and support (World Bank, 2000: xi). Laws and their enforcement are to keep 
MNCs, domestic society, and the government itself in check and accountable (Lieten, 
2001:112). This study will analyse the support or challenges presented to a state by 
the MNCs and other foreign government towards its institutions, beyond rhetoric and 
into specific cases and statements for pertinent insight. Levels of MNC compliance to 
the state’s laws, and the legal capabilities of the state to exert its authority over MNCs 
comes into play, as well as the external state’s support for the host state’s mandates 
(Araya, 2005:62; Zarsky, 2005:1). In light of FDI, and if tainted towards the investing 
company or source state, the relationship may hinder a government’s capacity to 
respond to the overall social, economic, and environmental needs within its host state 
(Chudnovsky et al., 2007:74). This is particularly so if the MNCs and external state 
discourage or impede a government from pursuing its policies geared towards national 
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development. As a government’s capacity for responsiveness to its state offers much 
of its perceived legitimacy and stability, this remains a strong indicator in a study of 
the relevance of FDI for development (World Bank, 2000:50); Chinese FDI might 
play a specific role in this context and will be analysed accordingly.  
 
 
2.6 Conclusion 
 
As Chapter Two has argued, FDI differs in nature from aid and traditional measures 
and indicators cannot be relied upon for assessing the impacts or relevance of FDI on 
the development of a recipient state. In distinguishing economic growth from 
development, relevant indicators leading to sustainability and capacity of a state to 
better handle its own continued advancement needed to be established. This chapter 
has established the relevance of key indicators used in the debate of assessing the 
relevance of FDI for development.  Through the lens of Capability Approach, 
relevancy is shown between FDI’s agency and the capabilities and functioning’s of 
the societal, economic, and political spheres of Zambia. Using this methodology to 
assess the relevance FDI plays allows for critique and assessment of the various 
claims put forth in chapter four. Through an overall assessment of specific reports, 
statements, and cases relevant to the proposed factors, the overall influence of a 
state’s FDI on a receiving state can be understood (Agosin, 2007:39). The value of 
this information can be utilized for the improvement of strategy and comprehension of 
the relationship between a foreign investing state and its MNCs through a larger 
established partnership (Agosin, 2007:39-40). This in turn can be used for improving 
the relationship for the improved actualization of sustainable development plans. 
Chapter four will utilize the indicators discussed in this chapter to analyse the 
relevance and trends between Chinese FDI and Zambian development specifically, 
assessing the debate surrounding this topic. Before, however, we will take a look at 
the context conditions for development in Zambia in the following chapter. 
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CHAPTER THREE: The Context of Zambian Development 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter provides an overview of the context and key influences on Zambian 
development progress as background to the discussion on Chinese FDI to Zambia. It 
begins with a synopsis of the history, socio-economic, and political realities of 
Zambia. In order to assess the overall relevance of FDI to the country, this chapter 
then gives an overview of the main avenues of financial flows to Zambia: aid, trade, 
and FDI. It will first review the financial flows from Western states and bodies, which 
have been the traditional major investors in Zambia. This is then compared and 
contrasted to the nature of financial flows from China. Each section reviews the 
predominant motivations to involvement with Zambia, the potential benefits and risks 
it poses to Zambian development, and highlights of the Zambian response to the 
financial influences from each body.  
 
 
3.2 Zambian Country Background 
 
Formerly a British protectorate called Northern Rhodesia, Zambia became an 
independent state in October 1964. At independence, Zambia had a small population, 
dependent on copper exports, and with hostile neighbours (Legum, 1966: 67; 
Kopinski et al., 2011(b): 183). At Zambia’s inception, Mozambique and then 
Rhodesia (now: Zimbabwe), as well as Angola were each ruled by minority white 
leaders who opposed the black rule in Zambia. As Zambia supported black liberation 
movements within these three countries, it was vulnerable to economic destabilisation 
needing support for its survival and growth (Mutesa, 2010: 167). The landlocked 
country at the time had exports worth US$130 million per year, and a per capita 
income of around $700, which was close to that of poorer European nations (Grant, 
2009:159). At independence, despite some political opposition, Zambia’s prospects 
for development, supported by its natural resources, were judged to be bright (Mutesa, 
2010: 167). 
 
Political Sphere 
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As for many African states, independence with an optimistic outlook faced 
considerable challenges alongside growth within the recently formed country. 
Kenneth Kaunda ran the country from his election in 1964 until 1991 under the 
socialist United National Independence Party (UNIP). From 1972 to 1991 he 
maintained a one-party state under his personal control, using privatisation of 
previously nationalised state assets to fund his neo-patrimonial style rule (Kopinski et 
al., 2011 (b): 183). He specifically built on the copper industry as the economic 
backbone of Zambia and managed to politically unite the ethnically diverse country 
while maintaining peace with neighbours, though his style of rule had several 
significant problems. Kaunda’s time in control is assessed as having seen patronage 
and self-interest weakens the state, recognized as poorly managing his post (Taylor, 
2006: 171). After an attempted coup and continued riots his twenty-seven year rule 
ended through mostly peaceful elections after which Kaunda acknowledged defeat 
through the ballot box. 
 
A switch to a multi-party system saw Frederick Chiluba elected president in 1991. 
President Chiluba, originating in the trade union movement and governing with his 
Movement for Multi-Party Democracy (MMD), presided over a rise in social-
economic growth. His government began to redress some of the structural issues left 
behind by Kaunda, liberalizing the economy and privatising most parastatals. While 
this was positive for the state revenue, the MMD government was regarded as unable 
to effectively fight high levels of corruption. Public funds were used as political slush 
fund, as some observers concluded. A strong civil society including trade unions has 
existed in Zambia. The trade unions were critical for the ending of Kaunda’s one party 
rule, and prevented Chiluba from running for office for a third term (Kopinski et al., 
2011(b): 182). In 2007, President Chiluba and 19 others were found guilty of 
defrauding the Zambian government of more than $41 million (TI, 2007: 4; Grant, 
2009:148). The corruption in state, established since President Kaunda has had 
detrimental costs to the country. 
 
From 2002, Levy Mwanawasa, the third president, ruled the country until his death in 
2008. Within his relatively short rule, his focus was on fighting corruption and 
increasing the standards of living. Since his death, the previous vice-president Rupiah 
Banda has taken over the presidency, and has maintained a stable political 
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environment (Van der Lugt et al., 2011: 59). During his presidency, Zambia has seen 
a boost in economic growth above five per cent, attracting FDI, and cutting foreign 
debt, but having a reduced focus on corruption. In September, 2011, Michael Sata, 
leader of the Patriotic Front (PF) won the national elections over Banda (Times of 
Zambia, Zambia: Sata is President, 23 September 2011). Sources report that Sata’s 
focused desire to get rid of corruption in Zambia was what won him the election 
(Times of Zambia, Zambia: President Sata makes maiden National Assembly entry, 
15 October, 2011).   
 
As a multi-party democracy, Zambia is relatively stable and peaceful. Politically, all 
four leaders have maintained outward attempts for state interest, and transitions of 
power have followed democratic procedure. However, while these realities have been 
a positive mark for the country, the political structure has still had issues needing to 
be addressed. Zambia has retained a high level of corruption since the rule of 
President Kaunda throughout all subsequent administrations (TI, 2007: 1). This has 
been a key issue hindering economic progress, and is partly to blame for the socio-
economic issues facing the country today. While the political sphere has remained 
relatively peaceful since inception, it developed a system prone to corruption and an 
interest in maintaining state control where possible. These themes run through current 
evaluations of state development for Zambia, and highlight key issues needing to be 
addressed by the government (Ndulo, 2008: 144; World Bank, 2000: 64).  
 
Socio-Economic Sphere: The Need for Investment in Zambia 
Since independence, copper has maintained a critical role in the Zambian economy, 
offering benefits and challenges alike. President Kaunda once used the saying that 
Zambia was born with a copper spoon in its mouth (Kopinski et al., 2011(b): 183). At 
the time, Zambia was the third largest copper miner in the world, after the USA and 
Russia (Mwanambuyu, 2011; Mutesa, 2010: 167). While this brought revenue for the 
state, it came with high dependence on the world market prices for this single 
commodity. Four fifths of the population still lived on subsistence farming, lacking 
skills and support to enhance their own economy (Grant, 2009: 159). While the 
country began its independence as a market economy, President Kaunda moved 
towards state control in the mining sector (and thus the core of the formal economy) 
in 1973, creating the Zambian Consolidated Copper Mines (ZCCM). With this move, 
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the Zambian government was taking greater control of the economy and limited 
outside investment (Kopinski et al., 2011(b): 183). Immediately before this time, 
Zambia’s employment through mining reached its highest level, employing 62 000 
workers at its peak.  
 
President Kaunda’s taking control of the economy resulted in a severe reduction in 
foreign investment. This was simultaneous to a reduction of international demand for 
copper due to the Oil Crisis in the same year (Mutesa, 2010:173). Lacking further 
investments, the state-owned mines were faced with technical problems that greatly 
impacted productivity. These factors together caused a major financial crisis for the 
state of Zambia that depended on copper revenue (Mutesa, 2010:173; Kragelund, 
2010: 209). The government at the same time had to subsidize local industries and 
needed to borrow heavily to finance them. By 1980, its debt reached $3.26 billion 
(IMF et al., 2000: 6; TI, 2007:4).  
 
By the mid-1980s, the Zambian government controlled around 80 per cent of the 
economy (TI, 2007: 3). The collapse of global copper prices in the 1980s sparked a 
depression in Zambia; the economy shrunk by a third. Zambia’s economy additionally 
suffered from waves of refugees from Angola and Mozambique (UNDP, 2010A: 42) 
during the civil war in both countries (fanned by the racist Apartheid regime in South 
Africa). Facing a severe lack of capital and a need for external support, President 
Kaunda began reversing his policies and started to release state control of the 
economy. 1985 saw the economic transitions away from state control. The national 
financial crisis forced the Zambian government to ally with international financial 
institutions (IFIs), namely the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank, 
i.e. policy prescriptions of these institutions trumped national policy convictions. The 
IMF and World Bank imposed price controls and Structural Adjustment Policies 
(SAPs) that aspired to ease direct control of the economy out of the president’s hands 
(Kopinski et al., 2011(b): 183). The SAPs required that for Zambia to receive the 
much-needed loans and finance, it had to reform its economy and open its doors to 
external trade and investment. ZCCM was split and was subsequently sold off to 
investors from Canada, Britain, India, Switzerland, South Africa and China (Kopinski 
et al., 2011(b): 183).  
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The SAPs assigned the state a minimal role, which ultimately crippled the productive 
sectors of African economies, retracting government control over policy and strategic 
options (Cheru et al., 2010: 2). This, in consequence, restrained the state’s ability to 
create or maintain its own development strategy (Ikome, 2007: 178). The economic 
liberalisation programme prescribed by the IFIs followed a clearly ‘liberal’ paradigm 
and was intended to allow for the private sector to ‘kick-start’ the Zambian economy 
(Kragelund, 2010: 209). This liberalisation was believed to entice FDI by making the 
Zambian economy more attractive, stable, and accessible. SAPs became a requirement 
for the Zambian government to receive its much-needed loans. By 1991, Zambia’s 
debt reached $7.36 billion. After the change of government, President Chiluba 
continued to privatised parastatals and further liberalized the economy (IMF et al., 
2000: 6; TI, 2007: 4).  
 
While this policy indeed opened up Zambia’s economy, it failed to ‘kick start’ 
economic growth. The country was left with less control over its economy and little 
benefit to speak of (Cheru et al., 2010: 2). Debt also had a crippling effect on the 
country’s capacity to govern itself and pursue its own agenda. Since the 1970s, 
Zambia’s export performance has worsened. Africa overall diminished to only 
attracting 2-3% of FDI of the entire developing world (Alves et al., 2006: 20). In 
2003, for example, Zambia was required to pay an estimated $325 million to the IMF, 
World Bank, and the Paris Club states, even though it was experiencing famines 
(Williams, 2004: 54). These issues have augmented Zambian response to Western 
donors and external plans for development, looking for alternatives to what many 
Zambians considered a ‘neo-colonial’ effort (Kopinski et al., 2011(b): 184). This 
economic and political situation has further encouraged exploration into partnership 
with China for aid, trade, and FDI (Cheru, 2010: 6; Gu et al., 2007:5).  
 
Zambia’s economy is still dominated by the exploitation of natural resources. Copper 
provides 70.3 per cent of Zambia’s foreign exchange earnings, and 8.5 per cent of its 
formal employment (Zambian Ministry of Finance and National Planning, 2011: 34). 
Despite its mineral wealth, compared to its neighbours, Zambia attracts less foreign 
investments than most sub-Sahara African countries and has experienced a scarcity of 
capital (Ndulo, 2008: 142; Le Pere et al., 2007: 253).  
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Copper mining constitutes the majority of the economic efforts; it offers a potential 
area for attracting FDI, and for providing employment. Copper is a strategic metal, 
which globally is becoming harder to find, thereby raising its world market value. 
Zambia’s economy has significant challenges, though seen to have enormous 
economic potential due to its natural resources, increases in FDI, and proposed plans 
(The World Bank Group in Zambia, 2008: 3).  
 
Despite these optimistic claims, the country has a long way to go in achieving 
economic growth to meet the country’s developmental needs. 5.5 million of Zambia’s 
current 11 million population are unemployed (Michel et al., 2009: 233). Economic 
challenges and high unemployment have contributed to Zambia becoming one of the 
world’s poorest states. Two-thirds of the population live below the poverty line with a 
Gross National Income per capita is $1,359 per annum (Kopinski et al., 2011(b): 183; 
UNDP, 2010a: 154). 17.8 per cent of the population is at risk of multidimensional 
poverty (UNDP, 2010a: 154). Zambia’s education services are limited. While pupils 
on average receive seven years of education, 30 per cent of the population are 
deprived of education (UNDP, 2010a, 172). Consequently, Zambia’s workforce is still 
seen to be predominantly unskilled and focused in manual labour (Kopinski et al., 
2011(b): 182). Health, however, remains a central issue with high prevalence of 
HIV/AIDS and malaria. Zambia has the fifth highest HIV prevalence rate in the 
world). This has severely impacted the country’s life expectancy, which holds at 47 
years (UNDP, 2010a: 42). The socio-economic challenges facing Zambia are the 
context within which the government has created its development plan.  
 
Developmental Focus of the Zambian Government: Where Should Investments Go? 
Overall, socio-economic and political challenges directly link to each other, leaving 
Zambia in a poverty trap that affects a great percentage of its population. This not 
only hinders economic growth, but also prevents sustainable development, limiting 
Zambia’s options for resolving its issues nationally. The extremity of its socio-
economic challenges give the Zambian government less capacity to be selective about 
which external actors become involved in aid, trade, and FDI. It also leaves Zambia in 
a place where its policies are so focused on first and foremost attracting financial 
flow that the regulation of those flows towards development-conducive policies are 
significantly limited (Van der Lugt et al., 2011: 59).  
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
	   35	  
 
While Zambia’s goals are relatively straight forward, it faces a number of challenges 
in achieving the economic growth and development it aims for. International bodies 
and states are aware that Zambia is less likely to turn down foreign investment 
because of its great need and limited alternatives (Raine, 2009: 39). Few if any 
options for Zambia appear to be free of risks or costs; turning to external actors comes 
with its own risks as they maintain their own self-interests in involvement in Zambia. 
Furthermore, there is no clear evidence that the Zambian government has a well-
elaborated framework for foraging economic relations other than opening its borders 
to those willing to give aid, loans, or investment (Mutesa, 2010: 168). 
 
Zambia’s current development strategy is to focus its foreign policy towards the 
economic issues. The government is focused on promoting positive interventions and 
attracting FDI (Mwanawina, 2008:5). The Zambian Ministry of Finance and National 
Planning (2011) has developed National Development Plans to guide Zambia’s 
development, focusing on economic and social development, and governance. 
Currently, Zambia is utilizing its Sixth National Development Plan (SNDP, which is 
focused on wealth and job creation through citizen participation and technological 
advancement (World Bank Group in Zambia, 2008:1).  
 
The Zambian government has targeted increasing FDI as a key strategy for increasing 
financial flow to encourage development and reduce its national debt. It is pursuing a 
liberal trade policy to increase GDP exports from 35% to 40%. The Zambian 
Development Agency (ZDA) mandates a focus on promoted exports to create wealth, 
jobs, and enhance economic development (Van der Lugt et al., 2011: 54).  
 
To further attract foreign investment as per its economic plans, the Zambian 
government has recently created several special economic zones (or areas specifically 
designated for foreign investment) (Giannecchini, 2011: 10). In 2007, three Multi-
facility Economic Zones (MFEZs) were launched. These are to allow for companies 
in these zones to have access to incentives including duty-free imports of raw 
materials, capital goods, and machinery. Two of these MFEZs are Chinese: one in 
Chambishi, and one east of Lusaka. The third special economic zone is Japanese 
(Kragelund, 2010: 211). The Chambishi MFEZ was expected to create an estimated 
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50,000 new employment opportunities for Zambia by 2010 (Mutesa, 2010: 171). 
While estimates place the Chambishi mine’s copper reserves to last until 2032, the 
MFEZs have yet to produce the employment levels expected (Mutesa, 2010: 174). 
While these strategies offer great potential for increases in FDI, there are still 
limitations. Economic growth at large is hampered by poor infrastructure, low quality 
of human capital, high costs of financial services, inefficiencies in public expenditure 
management, and limited access to land (Ministry of Finance and National Planning, 
2011:9). 
 
The World Bank (amongst others) has urged Zambia to develop other sources of 
revenue, particularly agriculture and tourism to better diversify its economy, and the 
government is following suit (World Bank, 2008: 225; Zambian Ministry of Finance 
and National Planning, 2011:9). Manufacturing has become the central focus of the 
government’s economic plans, attempting to reduce dependency on mining (Kopinski 
et al., 2011(b): 185). The economic climate still remains quite liberal, though it 
maintains several stipulations on employment (Kragelund, 2010: 211). In regards to 
FDI, there are no present stipulations on local content, technology transfer, equity, 
employment, or use of subcontractors for foreign investors and it allows for investors 
to repatriate any capital investments and profits freely (Kragelund, 2010: 10-12). 
Creating this attractive climate has seen FDI and GDP increase in Zambia within the 
past decade (SOAS et al., 2007: 34).  
 
 
3.3 Western Actors 
 
Since independence, many Western states have continued to hold political, social, and 
economic interests in Zambia. These have dominated over any of Zambia’s own goals 
or interests in the relationship, positioning Zambia as the weaker partner in its 
relations with Western countries (Ikome, 2007: 177). While the West’s approach to 
partnership has held altruistic elements and attempts to faster development in Zambia, 
development successes have not been realized. Whether this is due to failed national 
(or internationally driven) developmental strategies, or due to an insufficient amount 
of investment and support in reducing dependency and lack of focus on national 
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poverty is left to debate (Mawdsley, 2007: 415; Michel et al., 2007: 503; Ndulo, 2008: 
142).  
 
 
Key Trends and Motivations 
The history of Zambia has been highly influenced and dependent on Western 
economic sources. From its colonial inception from Britain, and continued after its 
independence in 1964, the Zambian state has been highly reliant on international 
efforts and support for its development plans. Zambia received significant input, aid, 
loans, trade, and investment from Western countries and the international institutions 
they created. However, it has failed to develop along the schematic Western imposed 
plans. As of 2010, Zambia has a lower HDI rating than it did in 1970 (United Nations 
Development Programme, 2010: 16). Western agencies trace numerous issues to 
explain this decline, including unequal economic growth, corruption, and failure of 
aid (Moyo, 2009:29).  
 
The West’s interests revolve around several key issues. Firstly, for security reasons, it 
explores options of getting oil from outside the Middle East, and preventing any 
future threats (Vines, 2007: 215). Secondly, the West is interested in seeing 
development and good governance come to African states, not least so as it is argued 
that improved governance is a precondition for development. Western MNCs are 
pressured to comply with ethical conditionality, and confront or avoid corruption and 
lack of transparency and accountability where possible (Mawdsley, 2007:407). 
Thirdly, development is seen to promote stability, democracy, and prevent terrorist 
uprisings. Supporting Zambia and other developing nations is seen as part of security 
a stabilized world. The stability would also produce larger markets and remove 
dependency from Western states. Britain utilizes MNCs, humanitarian and 
developmental NGOs, and international organizations to pursue its stated policies for 
promoting peace, prosperity, and democracy in Africa (Williams, 2004: 41).  
 
However, with a legacy of interventions, many Africans perceive Western intentions 
as a loss of sovereignty due to prescriptive policies, often regarded as paired with 
arrogance as national situations are felt not to be duly considered, and thus 
contributing to the widening inequalities. With structural adjustments, trade 
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inequalities, Northern protectionism, and legacies of Cold War sponsored violence 
and instability, diminish the integrity of Western claims of humanitarianism, justice, 
and fair dealing (Mawdsley, 2007: 414, 5).  
 
 
Financial Flows 
Western aid has played a major budgetary role for Zambia since independence. 
Western governments often tie aid provision to their own agendas and interests. As 
thus far, aid has not achieved visible development in Zambia, its value is contested. 
While it is still argued by some to be critical for development, it is being increasingly 
criticized as a problem rather than a cure for development. Because of its imposition 
on a government’s autonomy, and seen as a factor of dependence, it is in question 
(Moyo, 2009: 29). However, it has played, and still plays, a critical role in African 
developmental strategies, and is one of the key areas of financial flows to states.  
 
Western aid to Africa has totalled $400 billion since 1960, without clear progress or 
impact. Beyond giving aid, Western IFIs have been cancelling debts to further relieve 
developing countries. Its impact has yet to be fully seen. In Zambia alone, the World 
Bank had cancelled $2.7 billion in debt relief (The World Bank Group in Zambia, 
2008: 7). However, despite lacking evidence for developmental progress, Western aid 
projects continue to be pursued and promoted (Michel et al., 2009: 6).  
 
Current international efforts towards development have been encapsulated in the 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). They were signed on to by almost all world 
states in 2000, have been brought to the forefront of development work around the 
world and were developed to tackle absolute poverty by 2015 (Cheru and Bradford, 
2005: 11; Todaro et al., 2009: 23). Their ambitious goal is to reverse global levels of 
“poverty, hunger, disease, lack of shelter and exclusion – while promoting gender 
equality, education, and environmental sustainability” (UN Millennium Project, 2005: 
1). The strategy employed by the MDGs, however, is one based on aid, having 
developed nations provide developing nations with 0.7 per cent of their Gross 
National Product (GNP) (UN Millennium Project, 2005: 4). The MDGs, as with all 
aid projects, focus directly on actions directly tied to development, and are heralded as 
a universal effort towards development.  
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Trade has also been a key element in Western economic relations with Zambia. This 
trade has centred primarily on natural resources, particularly oil. Beyond economic 
interests, the public and their governments in utilizing trade and FDI as ways to 
promote good governance, ethical practice, and development where it can have held 
Western business accountable. At the time of liberalisation of the Zambian economy 
in the 1980s, the US, UK, and France accounted for 70 per cent of FDI within Africa 
(Alves et al., 2006: 20). Today, Western states are still the primary business partners 
in Africa. EU trade alone is marked at $200 billion per year (Carlsson, 2010:xi). The 
West has had a significant impact on Zambia’s trade, as the largest partners.  
 
In regards to FDI, American and British companies have dominated Zambia’s mining 
sector (Kragelund, 2010: 215). The mines were nationalized at independence under 
President Kaunda. In the following, community services provided by mining 
enterprises (including schools, hospitals and sport facilities) ended as they ran into 
disrepair and mismanagement (Michel et al., 2009: 238). While Western FDI was 
limited in Zambia’s history, its overall results were seen to be developmentally 
beneficial. ENYA Holdings, a British company with a mine in Luanshya, has high 
corporate social responsibility standards. It offers free health care, schools, and sports 
facilities, and is a fair example for other Western FDI set up in Zambia to date 
(Mutesa, 2010: 176-178; Michel et al., 2009: 240). Western trade and FDI is said to 
be contingent on good policies and human rights in Zambia, even though its history of 
involvement has not been able to produce this (Williams, 2004: 48). While its efforts 
may be well intended, they have not been sufficient in strategy or size to achieve 
developmental progress. 
 
Recognized Benefits and Challenges 
Continued economic relations with the West hold a number of potential benefits for 
Zambian development. In their dealings, Western States look beyond profits in their 
engagements in Africa. Considerations for sustainable development through 
addressing economic, environmental, and social issues alongside their business, 
companies from Western states are often held to high accountability for the impacts 
they have in African states (Carlsson, 2010: xi). Concerns over human rights, 
democracy, and transparency influence Western FDI (Carlsson, 2010: xi). 
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Additionally, and regardless of intention, Western aid has the capacity to directly 
address a number of the issues central to Zambia’s poverty trap with significant 
capacity and effect. While the MDGs rhetoric is similar to that of failed attempts in 
the past, its size and scope have the potential for furthering the capacity of Zambia’s 
populace towards development. 
 
However, there are issues and potential risks that need to be considered in the West’s 
approaches to development and integration. Firstly, their efforts are not large enough 
to meet Zambia’s economic needs on their own. The West has been reluctant in their 
economic involvement, and Western companies in the past have remained reluctant 
and small in their economic relations within Zambia. Secondly, their trade-related 
Investment Measures and bilateral investment treaties, as part of the WTO can reduce 
or stop the potential developmental benefits of financial flows by restricting Zambia’s 
capacity to maintain sovereignty and design and implement its own policies 
(Kragelund, 2010: 209). A specialised, compartmentalised aid policy might not be 
sufficient to better these negative effects; in fact, we might see a case of insufficient 
policy coherence by Western states across various specialised government agencies 
and the business sector. The requirements of Western IFIs to control the direction and 
implementation of policies can be a detrimental set back to the Zambian government 
whose own development plans can get lost in western agendas. 
 
In terms of a partner in development, African states overall are increasingly 
disenchanted with the Western world’s impact. In 2000, President Chiluba stated, 
“[Developed countries] are not prepared to discuss the issues of justice and fair play 
concerning the international trade and commercial sector, which imposes considerable 
suffering and privation on developing countries…The existing structure is designed to 
consign us to perpetual poverty and underdevelopment” (Kopinski et al., 2011(b): 
184). After fifty years of development assistance and cooperation it has yet to see 
substantial sustainable development progress. The West is seen to have used double 
standards with relations, aid tricks, and unfair trade practices and debt structures that 
only set the countries back (Cheru & Obi, 2010: 6). For these reasons, the Zambian 
government have been interested in exploring other economic partnerships. 
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On the other hand, The Zambian Ministry of Finance and National Planning (2011) is 
highly optimistic about the MDGs, suggesting that all the goals will be met except for 
environmental sustainability. While there may be criticisms of post-colonial sentiment 
and lack of substantial enough investment, aid is accepted. While there may be 
criticism, Zambia does recognize the limits of its options. It continues to accept and 
rely on Western finances.  
 
 
3.4 China’s Involvement in Zambia 
 
China’s economic relations with Zambia take a different approach than those of 
Western countries. With an approach that emphasises partnership and economic 
relations, China offers a significantly different partnership with its own potentialities 
and risks. As an alternative, the Zambian government has taken the Chinese 
government’s interest opportunity to strengthen its partnership. The Chinese 
government has pursued a foreign policy that rhetorically emphasises the interests and 
needs of Zambia and other African states more than any other. Its partnership and FDI 
is discussed as indeed holding the potential for achieving sustainable economic 
development and continues to grow in size (Alden, 2007: 126-129). In Africa, China 
is rapidly approaching the levels of the US (Michel et al., 2009: 3) and is only 
surpassed by Europe if the EU is regarded as one block, combining its components. A 
developing state itself, China has formulated its own approach to development and 
has seen remarkable progress since it itself began its plans for development (Beijing 
Summit of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, 2006:224; Kopinski et al., 
2011(a): 129). Its progress is leading it to become a global economic superpower (Le 
Pere, 2006: 13).  
 
China has rapidly industrialized after opening up to foreign investment and has made 
remarkable progress during the same period that Zambia has attempted to develop. It 
can thus be expected that Zambia values China’s policies for partnership since 2000 
as an offer with great potential and shared insight. While the two countries have been 
politically close since Zambia’s inception in 1964, the past decade (since the mid-
1990s) has seen unprecedented increases in collaboration, led by Chinese production 
and FDI within Zambia. This partnership, complimented with interwoven trade and 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
	   42	  
aid agreements has already shown increases in economic growth. However, this 
growth has yet to translate into development effects for Zambia. The impact had by 
China with its potential benefits also carries significant risks, argued by some to be 
severe enough to negate positive developmental progress at all (Kragelund, 
2007:213).  
 
Key Trends and Motivation 
Historically, Zambia has close relations with China. Only three days after its inception 
as a state, Zambia established diplomatic relations with China. It was the first African 
country to do so (Davies, 2001: 68). At Zambia’s inception, China had a lower GDP 
per capita than newly independent Zambia. China soon became one of Zambia’s 
largest economic supporters (Taylor, 2006: 165). Beyond trade, China also supported 
Zambia with aid, which was for Zambia more generous than the West and came at a 
time in which Zambia was geo-politically vulnerable in its neighbourhood.  
 
Between 1950 and 1980 China assisted with many liberation movements and began to 
partner with numerous states in projects and with aid similar to that given to Zambia, 
totalling some 800 aid projects (Obiorah, 2007: 35). This aid strengthened the 
relationship between the two countries. At this time, over 40 per cent of Chinese aid 
was directed towards transportation (Hutchinson, 1975: 219). The Chinese 
government spent most of this on the building of the Tanzam railway. This railway, 
costing over 160 million pounds at the time, connected Lusaka with Dar es Salaam, 
Tanzania, so that it could improve its trade without needing to export through its 
hostile neighbours to the south, east, and West, which were run by white minority 
governments at the time. Western countries had previously refused to invest in the 
railway line, as they expected it to be a major failure (Hutchison, 1975: 189; Chazan 
et al., 1999:455). The final success of this railway, which was completed by the 
Chinese workers ahead of time and under budget, came to signify the value of 
partnership with China for Zambia, and to date has been a much-referred to symbol of 
their relations (Obiorah, 2007:37), also for China-Africa relations more broadly, even 
though TAZARA’s maintenance and smooth functioning remains a challenge.  
 
In the 1980s, South-South solidarity was weakened by the predominant policies of 
SAPs, and a Chinese focus on internal reforms. While the 1980s saw little 
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involvement or collaboration between China and Africa, the 1990s saw China return 
to its policies, as it began to recognize the value of African support for its own state 
interests. During this time, however, bilateral trade between Zambia and China was 
only an average of $20 million per year (Mutesa, 2010: 170). In the early 1990s, the 
demise of the Soviet Union, and end of the Cold War together weakened the 
continent’s standing in its interaction with the rest of the world. 
 
Since 2000, however, China has increased its economic and diplomatic relations with 
countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America aggressively. Coming with its own 
strategies, motivators, and developed partnerships, China is felt to challenge Western 
political and economic dominance. The government in Beijing offers its own policies 
and strategies for partnership, and the clout of being a rapidly developing country 
itself, with a population exceeding 1 billion people (Mawdsley, 2007: 405). The turn 
of the millennium was the beginning of the significant re-connection and growth 
between China and Zambia. China’s ‘Go Out’ policy of 2001 encouraged Chinese 
enterprises to become internationally competitive players. Reduced overly 
bureaucratic procedures, tax incentives, chap loans, subsidies, and other forms of 
support from various state institutions encouraged them.  
 
In regards to Africa, China added an entire set of additional incentives for companies 
willing to invest. While there are high levels of independence in Chinese state-owned 
companies in running their day-to-day business, most established deals are handled 
government-to-government, giving China the ability to act on behalf of its MNCs 
(Van der Lugt et al., 2011: 35; Vines, 2007: 214). Yet, Chinese companies investing 
in Zambia do not always come according to a central government plan drawn up in 
Beijing, but also come individually, interested in the economic investment codes and 
liberal institutional set-up that opens opportunities for them (Kragelund, 2010: 213-5).  
 
China’s relationship with Zambia now fits into its much larger goals for the African 
continent. China founded the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in 2000, 
as the consolidation of China’s regional diplomacy in Africa (Alden, 2007: 35). 
Connecting with then 44 African states, FOCAC’s policies for partnership prioritize 
political relations, economic cooperation, international affairs, and social 
development. It is based on the principles of mutual respect of territorial sovereignty 
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and integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in the affairs of others, equality 
and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence (Michel et al., 2009: 25; Kopinski et al., 
2011(a): 129; Taylor, 2004: 89). FOCAC meets regularly every three years, and 
through it, China  has steadily increased its economic ties with African states.  
  
China’s renewed interest in foraging close partnerships with African countries comes 
for several reasons. The Chinese government changed its tactics from confrontation to 
cooperation, revolution to economic development, and isolation to international 
engagement (Mawdsley, 2007:412). China has clear state objectives in strengthening 
its partnership with African states. Firstly, on a much-publicized altruistic level, China 
shows interest in acting as a development partner looking to assist and share insights 
with African states. While these considerations are most vocalized by Chinese leaders 
at FOCAC meetings and with very visible infrastructure projects throughout the 
continent, there is much more at stake for Chinese interests.  
 
Secondly, as an economic competitor its efforts indicate shot term resource grabs with 
little account taken of local needs and concerns. For economic reasons, Chinese 
companies needs natural resources to supply the Chinese economy (and ultimately: its 
customers around the world) with raw materials of which China itself is short. Access 
to oil and natural resources have become a central motivation for Chinese investment 
and partnership. China is the largest consumer of copper in the world (Taylor, 
2006:179). In Zambia, with copper, nickel, tin, and uranium deposits, has been a 
special focus of Chinese attention. With recent discoveries of oil and gas in Zambia, 
interest is expected to rise further (Kopinski et al., 2011(b): 185). Chinese firms have 
steadily taken over Zambian firms traditionally owned by Canada, Israel, Europe, and 
Australia. Even during the recession of the late 2000s, China showed no signs of 
declining interest or commitment (The Times, ‘Chinese keep low profile to cash in on 
the slump in Zambia’, January 24, 2009).  
 
Furthermore, China sees partnership as an opportunity to develop markets for Chinese 
goods (Corkin et al., 2006:1; Shelton, 2006: 101). This is still relatively small in 
regards to China’s overall trade reality. While China is a critical player for Africa’s 
trade, Africa only constitutes for 3 per cent of China’s overall trade (Gu et al., 
2007:2). Zambia’s component in this is miniscule, even though  the special economic 
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zones run by Chinese enterprises indicate Chinese long-term economic interests in the 
resource-rich country (Davies, 2008: 49). Economic reasons provide a central 
motivator to the relationship for both sides.  
 
Finally, China’s political interests could be seen as a neo-colonizer, aimed to displace 
the West and lead to significant control over Africa and its resources (Alden, 2007: 5). 
The Chinese government wants to make a joint effort with Africa to establish a new, 
fair, and reasonable international economic order (Shelton, 2006: 100). Should China 
want to become a world power, it needs to actively strengthen and expand ties with 
African countries to improve its position within the international community (Deng, 
2008: 239). Politically, African states also offer clout in the international arena. It 
requires African partners to support its One-China policy, states that Taiwan is 
rightfully part of China. As the incidence of the Tiananmen Square in 1989 had little 
impact on Sino-African relations, China recognizes that African states are more 
interested in meeting their development and economic growth goals than taking 
ideological stances (Taylor, 2006:175). As African states share China’s opinions on 
sovereignty, human rights, and feelings of Western dominance, there is much to be 
gained out of these likeminded partners, politically (Deng, 2008: 242). The joining of 
these central motivations is shown not only in rhetoric, but also through how finances 
flow between China and Zambia.  
 
Financial Flows 
China’s partnership with Zambia incorporates political elements, human resource 
development, peace and security, and economic components in its scope. This section 
will particularly overview the economic issues (Mwanawina, 2008:4; Africa Policy 
Paper 2006). The partnership between China and African states exists in an 
inextricable blend of aid, trade, and FDI (Kaplinsky et al., 2007: 9; Grimm, 2011: 8).  
 
In regards to aid, China is the largest lender to, and investor in, infrastructural 
development in Africa (Cheru & Obi, 2010: 3). It has been involved in over 35 aid 
projects to date in Zambia. However, compared to other donors, China is relatively 
small (Davies, 2008: 62; Grimm, 2011: 3, 4). Its aid is stated to improve the capacity 
of African countries for self-development. Its efforts are broad in scope, covering 
healthcare, education, social development programmes, agricultural and basic 
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infrastructure construction, and protection of the environment (Forth FOCAC 
Ministerial Conference, 2009; Grimm, 2011: 10, 12). Of all of these, infrastructure 
development is the foremost effort, though it uses Chinese labour in construction 
products (Gu et al., 2007:10). 
 
China’s aid has been augmented by loans and debt-write offs as well. China has also 
offered unconditional loans to Zambia (Michel et al., 2009: 257). FOCAC has given 
considerable debt write-offs to Zambia, including $3 million most recently in 2006 
(Davies 2008: 61). Unlike Western aid and the MDGs, Chinese aid does not come 
with conditional stipulations stressing good governance or human rights, allowing 
African states to govern themselves (Kapinski et al., 2011:130). In this, it shows how 
Chinese aid is inextricably tied to its business and economic interests within these 
states. Its aid component to the partnership is used to earn good favour from the 
Zambian government, and draw attention away from its economic and political 
interests that may be more contestable for their impacts within the states. In its overall 
partnership, aid is relatively small.  
 
China’s size as a trading partner with Zambia continues to increase. Where in 2000 its 
trade with Africa as a whole barely surpassed $10 billion, by 2006 it exceeded $55 
billion, and has continued to grow since then (Michel et al., 2009: 12, 13). It has 
passed the UK, and is now only behind the US (Carlsson, 2010: xi; Cheru & Obi, 
2010: 3) if the European Union is not regarded as one block. In 2005, Africa had a 
$5.9 billion trade surplus with China. This is primarily based on China’s imports from 
Africa a large number of raw materials. However, removing oil from the calculation, 
Africa was left with a $7.3 billion trade deficit. This number indicates the reliance had 
on raw materials, and the focus of Chinese interest (Raine, 2009: 35).  
 
Chinese actors are arguably much more interested in trade and investment (Gu et al., 
2007: 11). For China, Zambia offers resource abundance, relatively open markets for 
goods, and a responsive investment climate (Alden, 2007: 36). While partnership and 
aid between China and Zambia began in 1964, Chinese FDI into Zambia began only 
after the political and economic reforms of the 1970s (Kragelund, 2010: 213). The 
1980s saw the Chinese launching of the Mulungushi Textile factory, funded by loans 
and aid. At the time, the factory produced over 60 per cent of the textiles in Zambia 
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(Taylor, 2006:177). Given its wealth in copper, Zambia currently maintains a trade 
surplus with China. In return for Zambian exports of natural resources, China exports 
textiles, apparel, food items, electronic goods, and automobiles to Zambia (Mutesa, 
2010: 171; Herman, 2010: 1). In terms of manufactured products however, Zambia 
exports very little to China (Kaplinsky et al., 2007: 9). In 2002 over 80 per cent of 
Zambia’s exports faced competition from China (Jenkins et al., 2006: 132). This 
challenge was primarily in way of manufactured goods, diminishing Zambian 
competitiveness. The Chinese government strongly encourages investment in Africa’s 
states (China’s Africa Policy, 2006). Zambia has also become a place for China to sell 
its cheap consumer goods, challenging Zambia’s own domestic markets (Michel et al., 
2009: 8).  
 
Trade with China poses a substantial of challenges for Zambia’s economy. To redress 
some of these inequalities in trade, FOCAC offers some duty free-treatment to 
encourage business on both sides. There are 452 products Zambia can export to China 
tariff free, though it has little ability to take much advantage of this. Zambians also 
have access to the Bank of China for finance and manufacturing operations for export 
of China (Gu et al., 2007:6; Manji et al., 2007:2). China has cost competitiveness in 
bidding; access to cheap capital through Chinese state-owned banks; access to low 
cost labour, access to cheap building materials (Corkin et al., 2006:1). All these 
together allow Chinese companies to make inroads more advantageous than other 
competitors. Zambian domestic markets are unable to undercut the Chinese 
production costs and prices. This negatively impacts their manufacturing industries, 
with a particular discussion on impacts in the textiles’ market (Kapinski et al., 
2011:131). Chinese companies, though given guidelines within FOCAC, are able to 
act on their own accord and are held to nothing higher than Zambia’s own regulations 
and enforcement. Even Chinese state companies may work autonomously if spurred 
on by competition (Taylor, 2009: 168).  
 
Chinese FDI is having a profound impact on the Zambian economy. It was through 
Chinese investors that the copper mines, smelters, and iron ore mines in Zambia 
started working again, after being idle for a generation, though this time under 
Chinese ownership (Alden, 2007: 3). In 1998, China’s Non-Ferrous Africa Mining 
(NFC) re-opened Chambishi, even though it arrived with low wages for the local 
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workforce, Chinese workers and managers, and did not allow unionization (Michel et 
al., 2009: 238). This has become indicative of the following Chinese FDI in Zambia 
since the founding of FOCAC. China has newly taken special interest in Zambia’s 
copper mines, as it is the largest consumer of copper in the world (Taylor, 2006:179). 
By 2006, 160 Chinese companies were established in Zambia (Raine, 2009: 57). In 
2009, China became the fifth largest country providing FDI to Africa (Van der Lugt et 
al, 2011: 9). China continues to increase its metal production ownership in Zambia. In 
May 2011, China made an unsolicited bid of $6.2 billion to purchase Australian 
owned Equinox’s copper mine (Nazareth et al., 2011). It also made Zambia an official 
destination for Chinese tourists, offering new revenue for its tourism industry 
(Shelton, 2006: 115; Kopinski et al., 2011(a): 130). To date China has invested over 
$1 billion into Zambia and created around 15,000 job opportunities. Close to 90 per 
cent of all funds have been focused on investment in mining (Kopinski et al., 2011(b): 
185).  
 
As a general rule, Chinese companies lack independence from government, and as 
such the Chinese government is often seen as responsible for these companies, that 
are often state-owned (central state and provinces). Yet, with thousands of firms being 
created in Africa, the Chinese government cannot control all of them (Alden, 
2007:57). It is these Chinese entrepreneurs who have the largest impact on Africa 
(Alden, 2007: 37). Chinese Multinational Corporations (MNCs) are given competitive 
political advantage, since China will work with any state regardless of standards or 
domestic issues; competitive economic advantage through low-cost bidding and lower 
paid Chinese labour; and low-interest loans and grants from the Chinese government 
(Alden, 2007: 41).  
 
While China has encouraged heavy FDI into Zambia, it has had several key issues in 
Zambia that are discussed as frustrating the Chinese efforts. High transport costs and 
poor infrastructure, discriminatory incentives, lack of skilled labour, limited access to 
local finance, labour relation laws, frequent strikes by workers, and poor local 
industries all are listed as weighing into the frustrations (Brautigam, 2009: 5; 
Broadman, 2007:21). Cultural and language barriers, and the Chinese need for fast 
work and long hours further frustrate business (Alden, 2007: 83), as regulation in 
Zambia in labour protection appears to be relatively high. Chinese FDI and trade have 
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also spurred at least 3000 Chinese immigrants to move into Zambia, though political 
party PF puts this number at 80 000 (Michel et al., 2009: 234).  
 
 
3.5 Conclusion  
 
As chapter Three has argued, from its complex poverty trap, the Zambian government 
has significant challenges to overcome in order to achieve development. With a 
natural resources-based economy, the country needs to look abroad for foreign 
investment that can be used towards its developmental goals. While aid, trade, and 
FDI have been offered traditionally from the West, whether due to inadequate size, 
poorly imposed strategies, or a created system of dependence, sustainable 
development progress was not achieved during the decades following Zambia’s 
independence in 1964.  
 
With the advent of rapidly growing Chinese economic relations with Zambia through 
its FOCAC partnership established in 2000, Zambia has been offered a partnership 
with different strategies and priorities. As this relationship grows substantially within 
Zambia, question needs to be raised as to whether the partnership will impact 
development within the country. While there are levels of optimism and potential for 
the relationship to produce the conditions and support needed for development, there 
are a number of significant risks presented as well. The contestability over the value 
and challenges offered by the unique approaches to FDI taken by western countries in 
comparison to the rapidly growing FDI from China raises questions. Chapter Four 
will analyse the debate surrounding Chinese FDI in Zambia through the key socio-
economic and political indicators established in Chapter Two. 
  
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
	   50	  
CHAPTER FOUR: Chinese FDI in Zambia’s Socio-Economic and Political 
Spheres 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
The rapid growth of Chinese FDI in Zambia has raised much debate around its 
relevance to Zambia’s developmental progress. Between 2000 and 2010, FDI into 
Zambia increased by US $878 million (Government of the Republic of Zambia et al., 
2011: 5). Within this, Chinese enterprises are the fastest growing and most visible 
group of foreign investors in Zambia, with both political and socio-economic 
implications, having already invested over US $1 billion (Kopinski et al., 2011(b): 
185, 187). The inextricable blending FDI into trade and aid within the overall 
partnership between the two countries intensifies the potential sphere of influence 
(Van der Lugt et al., 2011: 15).  
 
Arguments are made as to whether Chinese FDI offers a positive support to Zambian 
development, or whether it adds further challenge to the state. However, as explained 
in Chapter 2, where correlation between Chinese FDI and development may be highly 
likely, causality cannot be established. This leaves much open to argument within 
various indicators used within debate. As such, arguments range from seeing China as 
the ‘best country fighting poverty’ to a partner ‘ripping off’ Zambia and doing nothing 
for developmental progress (The Economist, 2011).  
 
In a positive light, China is seen to offer insight to African development efforts based 
on its own experience as a developing country. The Chinese government states that it 
sees Zambia on the threshold of a developmental take-off, and can play a positive role 
in this (Le Pere, 2007:210). China contributes to the Zambian economy through FDI 
with infrastructure projects, loans, aid, job creation and training. Due to this, the 
Zambian government regards China as a top priority investor (Kopinski et al., 
2011(b): 182). 
 
On the other side of the debate, negative effects are predominantly seen with regard to 
governance, labour standards, and the environment, which are issues avoided by the 
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Chinese government (Alden, 2007: 83; Kopinski et al., 2011(a): 129). While leaders 
from both sides have historically declared the Zambian-Chinese relations an ‘all-
weather friendship’, the past decade has seen mounting opposition (Kopinski et al., 
2011(b): 184). With a long political partnership with China, Zambia appears to have 
the highest anti-Chinese sentiment on the continent (Michel et al., 2009: 234; Mutesa, 
2010: 167). Most notably, political candidate Michael Sata has campaigned in a 
populist way, polemically arguing that Zambia is becoming ‘a Chinese province’ 
(Michel, 2009: 233). In 2006, Sata received 28 per cent of the national vote, including 
key seats in Lusaka and in mining areas where Chinese MNCs are most present 
(Alden, 2007: 74-75).2 In 2011, with a toned down anti-Chinese rhetoric, Sata won the 
national elections and is now the President of Zambia (Times of Zambia, Zambia: 
President Sata makes maiden National Assembly entry, 15 October, 2011). The issues 
addressed by Sata and academics and others concerned that Chinese FDI may not be 
conducive to Zambia’s development have also raised votes.  
 
This chapter will review the debate on Chinese FDI influence within the presented 
key socio-economic and political indicators for development. It will assess the 
substance of arguments and overall direction observed within these indicators and 
evaluated through the lens of Capacity Approach theory. This will offer an overview 
to some of the central trends of Chinese FDI and allow for critical analysis of the 
overall costs and/or benefits of the partnership. It will also provide an assessment of 
the debate and review the value of these indicators to the overall debate. The voices 
informing the debate here include the Zambian government, the Chinese government, 
Zambian political runners and unions; academics focused on Zambian development 
and/or Chinese influence in Africa. It will also include international academic reports 
focused on different aspects of Zambian development.  
 
The assessment will begin by critically assessing various key socio-economic 
indicators that can offer insight towards the developmental implications of Chinese 
                                                2	  Michael	  Sata	  ran	  as	  head	  of	  the	  Patriotic	  Front	  (PF)	  in	  the	  2006	  election.	  He	  ran	  on	  an	  anti-­‐Chinese	  platform	  arguing	  there	  was	  no	  developmental	  benefit	  to	  their	  involvement	  in	  Zambia.	  His	  platform	  came	  under	  fire	  of	  the	  Chinese	  government	  who	  threatened	  to	  remove	  completely	  from	  Zambia	  should	  he	  be	  elected.	  This	  ultimatum	  broke	  China’s	  own	  FOCAC	  principle	  not	  to	  interfere	  in	  the	  domestic	  affairs	  of	  its	  partners.	  While	  Sata	  only	  received	  29%	  of	  the	  votes	  in	  the	  election,	  he	  won	  seats	  within	  Lusaka	  and	  many	  of	  the	  mining	  ridings	  (Vines,	  2007:	  219;	  Alden,	  2007:	  75;	  Mutesa,	  2010:	  173).	  In	  September	  2011,	  Sata	  was	  elected	  President	  of	  Zambia.	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FDI in Zambia. The economic indicators analysed here are, as identified in Chapter 2, 
influence on (i) infrastructure expansion, (ii) market diversification, (iii) employment 
creation and conditions, and (iv) economic growth. The indicators studied in the 
political sphere, as also identified in Chapter 2, will include the influence on (i) the 
Zambian government’s dependency on loans and debt, (ii) pervasiveness of corruption 
and levels of transparency as measured in TI’s Corruption Perception Index, and (iii) 
strength of government institutions as measured by the Bertelsmann Transformation 
Index (BTI) reviewing the rule of law, democracy, social integration and welfare. The 
chapter will then conclude with an analysis of the overall direction of the debate 
within these various socio-economic and likely political implications of Chinese FDI 
on Zambian development based on the capabilities trends emphasized through the 
debate.  
 
 
4.2 Socio-Economic Indicators 
 
The acclaimed building of the Tanzam railway3 has been a reiterated example for 
China’s relations with Zambia and the potential it holds (Moyo, 2009: 104). The 
monumental construction of the Tanzam railway, possibly achieved two years ahead 
of schedule in 1976 (Ndulo, 2008: 139; Raine, 2009: 56), gave Zambia a means for 
exporting its resources through Tanzania, enhancing its economy and trade 
capabilities thereby potentially benefitting Zambia’s economy. However, there were 
also reported limitations to the developmental effects of the project. It used 20,000 
Chinese labourers to complete the task rather than indigenous workers. In this, there 
were significant shortfalls in transfer of technology and capacity building leaving 
issues with maintenance and repair. There were also issues in quality of construction, 
and the railway was subsequently forced into major outsourced repairs to China due to 
an inability to maintain it (Raine, 2009: 57). This case represents many of the 
recognized complexities, both beneficial and redundant that Chinese FDI presents to 
Zambian development experienced today.  
 
                                                3	  The	  Tanzam	  railway	  is	  alternatively	  referred	  to	  as	  TAZARA,	  which	  stands	  for	  the	  Tanzania-­‐Zambia	  Railway.	  It	  runs	  between	  Kapiri	  Mposhi,	  Zambia	  to	  Dar	  es	  Salaam,	  Tanzania	  (Ndulo,	  2008:	  139).	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4.2.1 Economic Growth 
As a definitive precursor for potential sustainable developmental impacts from trade 
or FDI, indications of economic growth are critical. Though economic growth does 
not equate to development, as argued in Chapter 2, it is one of the significant 
precursors to development for a country. This indicator cannot be used on its own to 
determine the conduciveness of FDI for development. However, it can be used as a 
basis for the discussion, as economic growth offers contextualization for other socio-
economic indicators. Nationally, the most common measurement of economic growth 
is by tracking GDP.  
 
Economic Growth in Zambia 
Historically, economic growth in Zambia has not been extensive or straightforward. 
Between 1961 and 2000, Zambia’s economy grew at the minimal rate of an average 
1.9 per cent per annum. During this time its population growth was much higher, 
overall resulting in a decline of GDP per capita (SOAS et al., 2007: 34). The 
economic decline in the late 1990s saw Zambia’s economic growth retract by 0.2 per 
cent between 1995 and 2000 (SOAS et al., 2007: 34). Zambia’s economic growth 
through its post-independence history remained far below the 6 to7 per cent line 
needed to reduce poverty significantly (CIA, 2006). In 2001, GDP per capita growth 
reached 4.9 per cent. As indicated in Chart 4.1, GDP growth continually grew over 
the decade, ultimately reaching a growth level that held the capacity to begin to 
reduce poverty. In 1999, Zambia’s GDP per capita was at $756 (UNDP, 2001: 153). 
By 2010, it reached $1,500, nearly doubling over the decade. While some of this can 
be attributed to rises in copper prices, overall structures were argued to have 
improved, further encouraging this growth (CIA, 2011: 1; Government of the 
Republic of Zambia et al., 2011: 5; Investment Tools, 2011). Furthermore, its 
economy remained relatively stable over this decade (SOAS et al., 2007: 34).  
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Figure 4.1: GDP Growth in Zambia 
 
 (SOAS & UNDP, 2007: 34; CIA, 2001; 2006; 2008; 2009; 2010) 
 
Chinese FDI and Economic Growth 
Of all indicators used in this study, economic growth is the least contested. Sources 
recognize that Chinese FDI is bringing economic growth and benefit (Kapinski et al., 
2011: 130). Additionally, the Chinese demand for copper on the world market has 
resulted in the price to soar, thereby resulting in higher values in Zambian copper 
production, hence economic growth (Grimm, 2011:4). Economically, within the 
mining sector, Chinese firms expanded Zambia’s capacity to export natural resources. 
This is having large positive effects on Zambia’s economic growth and investment, 
both directly and indirectly. These economic benefits are much larger than those 
obtained from exporting to the US or any other financially invested states (Meyersson, 
et al., 2008: 1, 19). Chinese investment in the Zambian economy has climbed steadily 
during the period of economic growth. It was during this ten-year period that China’s 
economic relations with Zambia strengthened, and it climbed to third place in terms of 
source country of foreign investment in Zambia, after South Africa and the UK 
(Kopinski et al., 2011(b): 185). Also encouraged by increased economic capacity 
through FDI, trade from Zambia to China increased over the decade. By 2009, China 
was responsible for 11.2 per cent of Zambia’s exports, and 4.7 per cent of Zambia’s 
imports (CIA, 2011: 4). 
 
Chinese FDI is argued to have contributed to the positive trend in Zambia’s economic 
growth experienced in the past decade (Ndulo, 2008: 41). With Zambia’s economy 
relying so heavily on mining, the re-opening of the Chambishi mine, purchasing of 
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smelters, and formation of the two Chinese Multi-facility Economic Zones (MFEZs) 
all contributed to economic growth. Zambia’s strong economic growth is said to be 
increasing to levels for spurring sustainable development (IMF, 2011: 3-6). Moyo 
(2008: 47) claim that Chinese FDI is beneficial to Zambia’s economic growth. For the 
Chinese government, this is one of the leading indications that the partnership is 
beneficial. However, as economic growth cannot be equated to socio-economic 
development, the evidence presented to support the claim that Chinese FDI is closely 
aligned to Zambia’s economic growth cannot be regarded as an immediate indication 
of developmental effects, despite high likeliness. Capacity Approach theory 
emphasizes how economic growth is not enough, though it can assist in addressing the 
transformation of resources into value, and increasing basic material needs. The 
following discussion of indicators such as infrastructure expansion, market 
diversification, and employment are all contextualized by economic growth that has 
been contributed to by Chinese activities, but cannot sole be tracked back to this 
single factor.  
 
4.2.2 Infrastructure Expansion 
To facilitate increased capacity for continued economic growth, Zambia needs 
upgrading of its infrastructure. It is expected that infrastructure expansion will also 
offer capacity for the improvement of services to the population, and the further 
attraction of FDI. The Zambian Ministry of Finance and National Planning (2011: 10) 
recognizes that poor infrastructure remains a key constraint on economic growth and 
poverty reduction. Infrastructure expansion can be measured through the expansion of 
roads, electricity production, railways, airports, and water pipes (CIA, 2011). While 
Chinese FDI and aid have both dedicated efforts towards infrastructure expansion, 
significant debate is raised as to how the work is done and whether it remains 
conducive to development.  
 
Infrastructure Expansion in Zambia 
Records indicate minimal improvements to Zambia’s infrastructure. Chart 4.2 
indicates a slight increase in national electricity production over the past decade. 
However, its increases still fall drastically short of national demand. In 2008, 78.4 per 
cent of Zambia’s population did not have access to electricity (UNDP (a), 2010: 218). 
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In the same year, only 50 per cent of Zambia’s population were covered by mobile 
phone network (UNDP (a), 2010: 218). 
Figure 4.2: Electricity Production in Zambia 
 
 (UN Statistics Division, 2011) 
 
Reports from the UN Statistics Division (2011) and CIA World Factbook (2001; 
2006; 2011) show stagnancy in railway and pipeline coverage of Zambia. They even 
indicate further reduction in infrastructure access in some areas; it is, for instance, 
reporting a decline in the number of airports in the country. In terms of road coverage, 
there have been no figures provided since studies in 2001, leaving progress studies 
here unavailable as a tool for assessment (UN Statistics Division, 2011; CIA, 2011). 
For what information is available, the lack of improvement to infrastructure leaves the 
structures and facilities in the state needed for growing increases in operation a 
significant impetus.  
 
Chinese FDI and Infrastructure Expansion 
While national indicators cannot overall convey substantial progress, the Chinese 
government boasts of numerous successful infrastructure projects within Zambia 
dating back to the Tanzam railway (Mutesa, 2010: 167). While infrastructure 
development is predominantly a government effort, the Chinese government in the 
past decade has significantly increased its aid in fields of infrastructure development. 
Chinese MNCs are also focused on construction and hold potential for benefiting 
expansions in this sector that is critical for sustaining economic growth and fostering 
development (Ndulo, 2008: 148). Critics argue that this is partially self-serving, in 
that they are improving access to the natural resources and businesses they are 
establishing (The Economist, 2011). Regardless, the benefits have the potential of 
being spread to the population at large, and being conducive to development. The 
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influence of Chinese MNCs offers substantial effort to Zambia’s infrastructure 
expansion, even if not recognized in national figures due to possible lack of updated 
records, or because infrastructure upgrades and repair are not recognized in figures. 
Of Chinese FDI, 16 per cent is focused on construction (Kragelund, 2010: 212).4 
Chinese firms have also built and rehabilitated roads towards Zimbabwe, constructed 
the Zamtel cell Tower, constructed a steel plant, and built the Chilanga Cement plant 
(Davies, 2008: 62).  
 
China has also supported technologies that have targeted commerce, industry, mineral 
extraction, and agriculture in Zambia. The purchase of the smelter is of great value, 
costing $220 million, and it is hoped to allow Zambia to add value to the raw copper it 
has been exporting (Brautigam, 2009: 100; Alden, 2007: 75). These infrastructure 
projects directly enhance the capacity for state economic growth and increases in 
investment. The main project for Chinese infrastructure efforts now is the 
construction of the Chambishi MFEZ (Kopinski et al., 2011(b): 186; Michel et al., 
2009: 255). These projects are argued to further infrastructure progress, though there 
seems to be little statistical or qualitative evidence in the debate as to whether this is 
being achieved.  
 
While Chinese activities offer a substantial number of projects, debate is raised as to 
the quality of infrastructure that has been developed. Assessment of the quality and 
quantity require access to prices and measures of quality control, which are not 
available (Grimm, 2011: 27). Critical case studies raise issue with how infrastructure 
projects are handled by Chinese firms. There are continual reports of Chinese 
infrastructure construction being inadequate, built sloppily and cheaply. For instance, 
Chinese-built roads from Lusaka to Chirundu, a distance of 130 kilometres, were of 
such poor quality that these roads were quickly swept away by rains (The Economist, 
20 April 2011; Corkin et al., 2006: 2). The Chinese government and MNCs take on a 
number of contracts as aid, very competitively offering bottom prices for their work. 
Overall, an impression prevails that, enhancement of infrastructure remains stagnant; 
Chinese efforts, while discussed positively, are also often criticised as severely 
                                                4	  The	  FOCAC meeting 2006 triggered the construction of an agricultural demonstration centre, two 
rural schools, a hospital, and an anti-malaria centre, and committed to continue its focus on 
construction in 2009 (Herman, 2010: 3).	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impeded by lack of quality and rapid breakdown of projects experienced frequently 
(Ndulo, 2008: 139). 
 
Infrastructure expansion remains an indicator with mixed reviews. The lack of 
systematic national information significantly reduces the capacity of any claims made 
for a desk-based study like this. Instead arguments for and against the conduciveness 
of Chinese FDI to infrastructure expansion are reliant on case studies that are 
currently available only to a limited extent at rather anecdotal level. Materialistic 
needs are addressed in terms of critical infrastructure, however the quality and the 
distribution of real opportunities it provides to society are limited.  
 
4.2.3 Market	  Diversification	  
Market diversification explores the reliance of a country’s GDP on a broader range of 
source of national income. The analysis of diversification is often done to explore the 
move away from a dominant source of state income, more often than not natural 
resources. For development to be sustainable, a country needs to transition from 
natural resources to a diversified economy reliant on manufacturing and services to 
balance out and prevent high reliance on natural resource prices. Market 
diversification would cushion the economy from external shocks, prevent the effects 
of ‘Dutch Disease’5, reduce dependence on a small number of external countries for 
manufactured imports, expand employment, and produce the tools to increase the 
value of products exported (Alves et al., 2006: 26). This section will utilize Zambian 
economic reports that reflect the percentage of GDP revenue from various sectors in 
order to explore the conclusiveness of arguments of Chinese support to development 
in Zambia. 
 
Market Diversification in Zambia 
Zambia’s economy is overly dependent on mining. With over 80 per cent of its export 
revenues coming from natural resources, the Zambian government’s Sixth National 
Development Plan (SNDP) weighs heavily on market diversification as a critical 
priority (Mawdsley, 2007: 416). Copper alone accounted for 70.1 per cent of exports 
                                                5	  ‘Dutch	  Disease’	  refers	  to	  when	  a	  country	  relies	  centrally	  on	  natural	  resources	  for	  its	  GDP.	  Instead	  of	  the	  funds	  benefitting	  development,	  the	  income	  from	  the	  natural	  resources	  can	  artificially	  increase	  the	  currency,	  hurting	  the	  overall	  economy	  and	  further	  increasing	  the	  reliance	  on	  the	  resource	  (Alves	  et	  al.,	  2006:	  26;	  Rocha,	  2007:	  31).	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in 2007 (Financial Standards Foundation, 2009:7). The Zambian Ministry of Finance 
and National Planning (2011) recognizes that natural resources could provide an 
impetus to economic development, and that there is a great need to aggressively 
diversify the economy including agriculture, tourism, manufacturing, mining, and 
energy (2011: 11). These priorities for market diversification are further recognized 
and encouraged by the World Bank and UNDP for Zambia’s developmental 
progression (Bernstein, 2010: 252). 
  
Figure 4.3: Breakdown of Zambia’s GDP per Sector 
 
 (CIA, 200; 2005; 2011) 
 
Chart 4.3 overviews the trends of agriculture, industry, and services in Zambia. 
Trends towards development should show a slow decline in industry and an increase 
particularly in services for these efforts of market diversification to be actualized 
(Alves et al., 2006: 20). This has not been the case for Zambia over the past decade. 
Overall, industry has expanded slightly in the past decade, which is positive. 
However, simultaneously services have somewhat declined and agriculture has 
remained relatively unchanged (Alves et al., 2006: 19). However, when these trends 
are considered within the context of the steady GDP growth, and within the Zambian 
emphasis on copper and natural resources, each sector has relatively stood its ground. 
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The diversification of Zambia’s economy will rely heavily on the needed expansion of 
services in order to remove dependency on natural resources.  
 
Chinese FDI and Market Diversification 
The overwhelming focus on raw materials and the subsequent threat of ‘Dutch 
Disease’ effects and reinforced dependence on natural resources is a key concern 
raised in criticism towards Chinese FDI in Zambia (Kopinski et al., 2011(b): 186; 
Rocha, 2007: 31; Ndulo, 2008: 144). As China focuses so heavily on natural resource 
extraction, its effects on manufacturing and service industries might be negligible or 
even detrimental. The strong focus on the mining industry, which is addressing one of 
the drivers of Chinese FDI, does hold the risk of increasing the state’s dependence on 
natural resources if not properly acted upon by the Zambian government. China’s 
FDI, in that case, is certainly not a force for development in and by itself. Reliance on 
the mining sector also exposes Zambia to significant income fluctuations (Kopinski et 
al. (b), 2011:186; Alves et al., 2006:24).  
 
Even though financially most heavily weighted in the mining industry as it is a capital 
intensive sector, Chinese companies reportedly are involving themselves in a wide 
range of sectors including tourism, retail and wholesale, transport, communications, 
health, and education (Alves et al., 2006: 22). As Kragelund (2010: 212) reports, only 
eight of the 200 Chinese companies in Zambia are directly involved in mining 
activities. The remainder are in other sectors. 43 per cent are in manufacturing, 21 per 
cent in services, 16 in construction, 13 per cent in agriculture, and 2 per cent in timber 
(Kragelund, 2010: 212). However, the majority of those in manufacturing are related 
to mining, increasing mining related activities to cover at least 70 per cent of Chinese 
FDI. According to Kopinski, China pledged an even greater share, 89 per cent ($5.5 
billion), of its FDI between 2000 and 2009 towards the copper industry, most 
probably indicating primary investment interests (Kopinski et al., 2011(b): 185). The 
surge of Chinese FDI has maintained the economic dependence on copper. With 
recent discoveries of oil and gas within Zambia, Chinese FDI into natural resource 
sectors is likely to increase further (Kopinski et al., 2011(b): 185).  
 
With regards to manufacturing, literature often discusses Chinese MNCs as posing a 
threat to Zambia’s small domestic industries rather than a benefit. However, before 
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China’s significant growth in FDI, Zambia’s textile output had already shrunk 
considerably in the 1990s (Taylor, 2009: 168). This was due to international 
competition and poorly run factories such as the notable Mulungushi factory. The 
Mulungushi textiles factory, once fostered by the Chinese with a $200 million loan, 
was forced to close. Its demise is attributed to the competition imported from Chinese 
textiles (Gu et al., 2007: 7; Alden, 2007: 73). Chinese made products have only 
further challenged this sector (Taylor, 2009: 169). For Zambia’s economy to benefit 
from Chinese engagement, it needs to ensure that it can manufacture, assemble, and 
sell its own resources, as Raine argues in this context (2009: 45).  
 
With Zambia importing China’s low priced commodities, local manufacturers find it 
difficult to compete against cheap mass production (Kaplinsky et al., 2007: 11; Alden, 
2007: 47). The goods brought by Chinese companies setting up in Zambia are highly 
competitive and are seen as providing ‘poor quality’ government subsidized goods 
that challenge domestic producers (Taylor, 2009: 170; Mutesa, 2010: 171). This is 
having critical costs to the local industries and on employment (Mutesa, 2010: 173). 
In 2007, opposition politician Michael Sata accused Chinese firms of purchasing 
supplies from other Chinese mining firms rather than locally. This, he argued, 
prevented an encouragement of local business and improved enhancement of the local 
economies beyond employment in mining (Mutesa, 2010: 173). While China was 
regarded as ‘flooding’ Zambia’s markets, other than natural resources, there is little 
reciprocal flow to China (Broadman, 2007:34). While Zambia exports natural 
resources, predominantly copper, it imports textiles, apparel, electronic goods, and 
automobiles from China (Mutesa, 2010: 170).   
 
As Michel (2009:115) polemically expresses “To take a country, you don’t need 
colonialism, you need to have competitive goods to trade” highlighting opinion that 
China is acting in a neo-colonial way through its creation of highly competitive 
business in Zambia. Selling products in Zambia at a fourth or fifth of the regular price 
with long shop hours gives Chinese shopkeepers this advantage (Michel et al., 2009: 
115, 117). In Lusaka, Chinese businesses reportedly halved the cost of chicken and 
reduced the cost of cabbage by 65 per cent, making it unfeasible for local traders to 
continue business negating any benefits to the population’s access to cheaper goods 
(The Economist, April 20, 2011; Mawdsley, 2007: 416). Former South African trade 
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minister Dipak Patel further questions “Does Zambia need Chinese investors who sell 
shoes, clothes, food, chickens, and eggs in our markets when the indigenous people 
can?” (Alden, 2007: 49). Small-scale Chinese businesses are argued to be 
inadvertently detracting from Zambia’s attempts to foster its own local industry. 
 
In defence of Chinese MNCs, some of these issues experienced over the past decade 
are noted to already being addressed as apparent in some notable case studies. 
Recently some companies addressed this, when several Chinese firms including 
Luansha’s Copper Mine (CLM) have made it policy to give 75 per cent of contracts 
involving locally sourced goods to local companies. This has reportedly increased 
business between local suppliers and Chinese business in these situations and is 
expected to have significant impact on the economy at large; where CLM employs 
2,508 people, their suppliers and contractors employ over 6000 (Times of Zambia 
April 11, 2011). This creation of employment has the potential to encourage market 
diversification including industry supporting the mining, though arguably not enough 
to reverse trends of dependence on mining. 
 
While in manufacturing there have been significant contested issues, the Chinese 
government argues to be having positive influence in services. China’s promotion of 
tourism in Zambia is said to be a step towards market diversification (FOCAC, 2005). 
The Zambian government’s official marketing within China is a recognized influence 
on the growth of the tourism market in Zambia, though figures could not be produced 
to substantiate its value (Broadman, 2007:2). While national records show tourism to 
have risen from 457,000 arrivals in 2000 to 812,000 in 2008 (UN Statistics Division, 
2011), it is unclear what percentage of these arrivals are from China. 
 
In sum, Chinese FDI is rather discussed as presenting a challenge to market 
diversification. While it is heavily focused on resource extraction increasing the size 
of mining capacity in Zambia, Chinese MNCs also are presenting a challenge to 
market diversification by outcompeting alternate sources, particularly in the 
manufacturing industry. This presents a challenge for the Zambian government and 
the economy. The debate surrounding the conduciveness of Chinese FDI to market 
diversification touches on numerous points. While Chinese support in the debate 
emphasizes positive efforts in many sectors of the Zambian economy, statistics show 
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a primary focus within the mining industry. Despite creating employment, substantive 
arguments are also made around the labour issues and competition created within the 
informal sector and domestic markets. These are all limiting factors within Capacity 
Approach theory, and would be seen as non-conducive for development. These further 
raise issue with Chinese FDI becoming a barrier to local business. The information 
substantiating these claims available for the debate remains limited. They are a 
mixture between national studies and specific cases that can only somewhat uphold 
the arguments made on either side. 
 
4.2.3 Employment	  
One of the primary expectations of host countries for FDI is to gain domestic 
employment opportunities by international firms. National employment figures 
provide the most significant synopsis of the impact of the incredible growth of FDI in 
the country in the past decade. The debate surrounding Chinese influence on 
employment in Zambia explores not only the employment numbers provided by 
Chinese MNCs in various sectors, but also the quality of jobs, measured by the 
conditions for the workers. While figures of employment in the formal sector are used 
to substantiate the conduciveness of Chinese FDI within employment, numerous 
labour issues faced by those working with Chinese firms, or in competition are used to 
question the value of job creation in light of its realities for Zambian workers. 
 
Employment in Zambia 
In 1986, employment in the formal sector peaked at 556,000 people according to the 
Zambian government (SOAS et al., 2007: 47). This declined slightly by 1992, 
reaching 546,000 people partially due to declines in copper prices, despite a growing 
population. From 2008 statistics, records show that only 300 000 jobs exist in the 
formal sector with an additional estimated 4.7 million people working in the informal 
sector. Though UN Statistics since 2000 was unavailable (UN Statistics Division 
2011), alternate sources indicated that for the population at large, this means that 80 to 
90 per cent of employment in Zambia remains in the informal sector (Financial 
Standards Foundation, 2009: 8).  
Yet, Chart 4.4 also indicates employment has increased steeply in the country in both 
the formal and informal sectors. This is increasingly notable as the period also occurs 
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over the global recession experienced from 2008 onwards (Bertelsmann 2010: 2). 
Chart 4.5 indicates that there are very substantial gains in employment the country.  
 
Figure 4.4: Informal and Formal Employment Figures in Zambia 
 
 (CIA, 2002; 2006; 2010) 
 
Figure 4.5: Levels of Informal and Formal Employment in Zambia 
 
 (CIA, 2002; 2006; 2011) 
 
Chinese FDI and Employment 
The strongest arguments for Chinese FDI being conducive to employment in Zambia 
are the numbers of people employed by Chinese MNCs coming into the country; the 
Chinese government emphasizes the direct employment in MNC beyond thousands of 
workers in mining itself. Yet, there are also indirect gains by demand for copper from 
Zambia, which lead to a revival of the mining industry. This also created employment 
opportunities and higher income levels, which, in return, also will have led to higher 
consumption levels, again contributing to job creation. With still high levels of 
national unemployment, there is great need for employment opportunities within 
Zambia and Chinese investments indeed offer a source of employment (Raine, 2009: 
44). The Chinese construction of MFEZs are intended to further increase employment 
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of Zambians by Chinese firms. The Chambishi MFEZ was expected to employ 50,000 
by 2010 (Mutesa, 2010: 171). The MFEZ itself is expected to last 25 years (Mutesa, 
2010: 174). By the end of 2011, the MFEZ is expected to have 40 Chinese companies 
and at least 10 from other countries (Brautigam, 2009: 101; Giannaccheni, 2011: 11-
12). According to FOCAC reports, 25,000 Zambians to date are employed by Chinese 
firms; this is below the self-declared goals (FOCAC, 2011). Information regarding 
employment within the MFEZs themselves is not available. While inflated goals are 
not being met, Chinese FDI is nonetheless indicated as positive for providing 
employment. 
 
Under the banner of aid, FOCAC 2006 provided an increase in the number of 
Zambian professionals receiving training in China, over a hundred government 
scholarships, and numerous diplomatic and bureaucratic training programmes 
organized by the Chinese government with a broad scope of relevant topics including 
healthcare, economic development, and environmental issues (Davies, 2008: 62). 
Beyond aid, however, there is expectation that FDI will provide the transference of 
skills to the domestic workforce, and bring technology and technological skill into the 
country that can spur on local business and capability (Broadman, 2007: 25).  
 
While Chinese FDI does offer employment, there are great disputes over the 
conditions of employment. Chinese mining companies are usually state-owned; they 
are not responsible to shareholders or restricted by regulatory and reputational 
concerns in the same way Western companies are (Taylor, 2006:179). That said, while 
the Chinese government publicly states that Chinese MNCs are to uphold the local 
laws and standards, it has little capacity to directly manage their work. There are a 
number of critical issues around the conditions of employment offered by Chinese 
MNCs in Zambia, such as safety and labour standards. Beyond employment figures, 
variations in minimum wage are valuable to consider. Zambian employees and Union 
workers regularly are protesting for resolution of safety issues, and against alleged 
abuses, as well as against low wages in Chinese MNCs (Mutesa, 2010: 172; Taylor, 
2004: 99). At some mines, unions have been banned, in violation of Zambian 
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legislation6 (Alden, 2007: 74). China is said to have low mining health and safety 
records, with issues of lacking corporate governance and responsibility (Taylor, 2006: 
178).  
 
In 2008, the minimum wage in Zambia was set at US $52.19 per month, though 
increased to $70 by 2010, showing a beneficial increase in support for workers 
(Financial Standards Foundation, 2009: 4; Mutesa, 2010: 171). Allegedly Chinese 
companies, however, pay Zambian employees wages significantly below minimum 
wage without repercussion; cases mentioned in this context are Chinese run 
Chambishi and Collum mines and BGRIMM (Mutesa, 2010: 171). This is being 
discussed as having influenced a downward pull on wages worsening conditions, and 
creating a disparity between Chinese and Zambian workers at the same task (Mutesa, 
2010: 171). Furthermore, mine workers are often left with unsatisfactory safety 
conditions as well. Employees are reportedly expected to work for two years before 
receiving safety helmets. Additionally, ventilation in the mines was said to be poor 
quality and accounts for deadly accidents a numerous (The Economist April 20, 
2011).  
 
While jobs are being given to Zambians, and employment is being created, more 
might be done, as Mutesa argues. Mutesa (2010: 173) claims that long with 
challenging employment levels, Chinese firms bring unskilled, semi-skilled, and 
skilled Chinese labourers to do things that Zambians could do. At the Chambishi 
mine, of the eleven members on the senior management team, only one is Zambian 
(Mutesa, 2010: 174). Zambian employees appear to remain at basic levels, thus 
making the argument of transference of skills more questionable. The benefits in 
terms of the transference of skills to Zambian workers through Chinese FDI – and 
thus on the quality of employment – appear to be minimal (Kragelund, 2010: 209, 
211).  
 
There have also been noted riots at mines where workers express frustration with 
underpay, unsafe working conditions, and the banning of trade unions (Alden, 
                                                6	  China	  does	  not	  allow	  for	  independent	  trade	  unions	  on	  its	  own	  territory.	  Thus	  investors	  are	  facing	  an	  unfamiliar	  –	  and	  arguably	  uncomfortable	  –	  situation	  of	  having	  to	  negotiate	  with	  unions	  (Wei	  et	  al.,	  2009).	  The	  freedom	  to	  form	  unions,	  however,	  is	  one	  of	  the	  key	  rights	  in	  a	  democracy,	  including	  Zambia.	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2007:74). In 2008 the Chambishi mine experienced a riot of 500 workers because of 
unfair contracts, safety concerns, and low pay. At the Beijing Research Institute of 
Mining & Metallurgy (BGRIMM), allegedly the lack of safety precautions led to the 
death of 50 Zambian employees; as casual workers were affected, no compensation 
schemes were offered (Mutesa, 2010: 176; Gu et al., 2007: 7). These claims translated 
into voting records in 2006 already, where Michael Sata, running on his anti-Chinese 
platform won all seats in the Copperbelt region, where locals declared the Chinese 
were ‘ripping them off’ (The Economist, 20 April 2011; Raine, 2009: 138). Michael 
Sata has since won the election in September 2011 and has become President of 
Zambia. 
 
The debate around the conduciveness of Chinese FDI to employment emphasizes that 
quantitative figures alone cannot adequately reflect the situation, backed by 
substantive evidence. While Chinese FDI does provide employment for Zambians, the 
issues raised by unions, protesting Zambian workers, and political leaders such as 
Sata give context to the debate. National figures indicate a rise in employment, and 
Chinese MNCs are arguably providing employment for thousands of Zambians. Yet, 
the qualitative issues accompanying this employment raise considerable question as to 
whether the employment provided actually is contributing to development. In light of 
Capacity Approach theory, while employment in general is advantageous for the 
addressing of basic materialistic needs, the non-materialistic value of the employment, 
as well as the safety and opportunities for promotion are clear setbacks. The 
information provided in this debate remains on different levels, one side relying on 
quantitative information, and the other on qualitative considerations. Where Chinese 
FDI offers much-needed employment, the conditions facing many of the employed 
are not conducive to empowerment, fair conditions, or a transference of skills. While 
Chinese FDI might not actively detract from development, it does not automatically 
offer conditions conducive for advancement either. 
 
 
4.3 Political	  Indicators	  
 
The socio-economic partnership is tied closely to the political debate as already hinted 
at in the discussion of employment creation. FDI has a political significance due to the 
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inevitable interaction of corporations with the law and regulations within the state. As 
Chinese FDI is intertwined with the political relationship between China and Zambia, 
the influence of Chinese FDI also further extends into the political realm. Investments 
have the potential to empower government to better respond to its citizens and to gain 
space for policy making. Alternatively, it can increase detachment from the 
population – not least so by fostering corruption – and ultimately weaken state 
institutions through poor practices and limitations on accountability. 7  
 
The indicators studied here will include the influence on the Zambian government’s 
dependency on foreign aid and loans, its control over domestic issues, its influence on 
transparency, and its overall capacity to direct the country’s future course. Similar to 
socio-economic indicators, the debate is reliant on case studies, reports, and 
assumptions within the larger context of measurable national trends. While the 
Chinese policies emphasise a renouncing of interference within the domestic issues of 
other states, any external support has sway on the political realities of Zambia.  
 
4.3.1 State Dependency on External Actors  
Dependency of a state on external factors (including finance from other states) is 
highly discussed in matters of development. As experienced by Zambia with the SAPs 
from the IMF in previous decades, financial obligations through loans limit the 
autonomy of the government to make its own policies and govern its own country as it 
sees best. Notably, being a recipient of aid often comes with its own strings, 
obligations, and priorities that diminish a government’s sway over its own direction. 
With Chinese state agencies offering substantial loans and aid to Zambia, often with 
limited transparency, debate is raised as to whether it is conducive to Zambia’s 
development, or re-creating a structure of debt and reliance, and dependency 
(Brautigam, 2009: 12).  
 
State Dependency on External Actors in Zambia 
Beyond a dependency on copper markets for a sizeable portion of tax revenue and as a 
source of employment, Zambia has – since the 1980s – become increasingly 
dependent on loans and aid from foreign countries and international organisations. 
                                                7	  Guy Scott, deputy leader of the Zambian opposition party was quoted saying, “The Chinese […] are 
seen as cheats and our government as crooks for allowing them to get away with it” (Alden, 2007:76).	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Zambia’s government has taken significant loans to cover expenses, creating a debt 
that limits its finances and obligates it to oblige the interests of the lender. Zambia’s 
autonomy and capacity as a state were thereby limited. FDI, though much is tied to 
copper, might offer a route to address socio-economic issues, increase government 
income, and reduce its reliance on debt and aid.  
 
Figure 4.6: Zambia’s External Debt Compared to its GDP 
 
 (UNDP (b), 2010; CIA 2002; 2006; 2011) 
 
In the 1980s it was its reliance on debt that forced the World Bank’s SAPs that 
removed governmental control and set back the national economy significantly. 
Benefiting from Western Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI) and Heavily 
Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiatives8, Zambia’s external debt was cut from a 
staggering $4.5 billion to $635 million in 2006, resulting in substantially improved 
debt/GDP ratio as can be seen in figure 4.6. However, the figures for 2010 already 
include new debts. In 2007, Zambia took large amounts of loans from China, adding 
to the amounts already owed (Davies, 2008: 48). External debt increased from $2,014 
million in 2006, to $3,407.3 million in 2009 (Zambian Ministry of Finance and 
National Planning, 2011: 9).  
 
Concerns are raised in the debate about Zambian efforts for autonomy and capacity to 
address its own issues, possibly undermined by Chinese loans and unsustainable debt 
(Alden, 2007: 89). The financial conditions of Chinese loans to Zambia (and 
elsewhere) are not known to the public (Grimm, 2011:7).  It risks placing greater debt 
on Zambia and with this, increasing its obligations to China, much to the concern of 
                                                
 9The HIPCs are developing countries with large debt and high levels of poverty. They are eligible for 
low-interest loans and aid from the IMF and World Bank. The MDRI is an extension of the HIPC.  
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western donors and analysts (Kragelund, 2010: 213; Taylor, 2006: 165; TI, 2007: 6). 
However, these concerns might be exaggerated. As indicated in chart 4.6, Zambia’s 
debts are reducing steadily while its GDP grows. While it may be taking on loans 
from China, it is not increasing its debt disproportionally, but continuing to reduce it, 
showing prudence and capacity.  
 
Chinese FDI and Dependency 
China offers a chance for Zambia to reduce its reliance on financial flows from 
Western countries and institutions. Furthermore, if Chinese rhetoric is translated into 
practice, it might allow the Zambian government to set its own priorities, given the 
emphasis on sovereignty and non-interference. This would, indeed be different from 
Western involvement, which attempts to guide and control the course taken. While it 
may reduce Zambia’s dependency on the West, some suggest it may easily be 
replaced with dependency on China (Le Pere et al., 2007: 159; Kapinski, 2011:132). 
The indifference towards human rights, corruption, and the lack of transparency in 
Chinese flows are often justified by official Chinese rhetoric referring to principles of 
sovereignty. This is discussed as potentially stifling the attempts of Western states of 
the World Bank and IMF (and, indeed, of African institutions like NEPAD) to 
improve governance in recipient states (Deng, 2008: 242). For example, Chinese arm 
sales in Zambia have fuelled regional conflicts and domestic strife, similar to those 
they have caused in Ethiopia and Sudan (Deng, 2008: 244).  
 
In terms of Chinese aid to Zambia, there is a lack of transparency and blurred lines in 
Chinese aid, trade, and FDI (Bautigam, 2009: 12; Grimm 2011). Lack of information 
available prevents insight into whether amounts of aid are increasing or what tied 
obligations may come along with the aid. The debate on both sides remains limited to 
suggesting potential benefits and risks. Based on what information is available, 
Zambia does not appear to be near dependence on China, but rather seems to broaden 
the base of its financial obligations, diversifying the actors and thus spreading risks. 
Uncertainty exists as to whether this is setting back development potential through the 
real freedoms of the government or not.  
 
With limited transparency into the details of Chinese loans and aid, much is left to 
speculation. As such, the debate remains relatively inconclusive, reliant on further 
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information and transparency to better substantiate argument. This debate carries over 
into the next indicator, transparency and corruption.  
 
4.3.2 Transparency and Corruption 
Fighting corruption is needed to better run a government responsible to its citizens 
and economic partners. Political and administrative corruption hampers reforms and 
developmental progress and lack of transparency is at least hampering policy planning 
and control (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2009: 2; Grimm, 2011: 2). Transparency in 
government and levels of corruption are understood to be diametrically opposed. 
Transparency is an essential step towards addressing issues of corruption and 
patrimonialism within a state (Ndulo, 2008: 204).  
 
Transparency and Corruption in Zambia 
Zambia, like many African countries, is discussed in the context of weak regulations, 
where state elites can be persuaded to take a relaxed approach to their enforcement 
(Raine, 2009: 45). While corruption is understood as a major problem in Zambia, it is 
one the government has been addressing, addressing also the highest office bearers. 
Most notably, former President Chiluba was prosecuted for graft in 2007, indicating 
some action is being taken, though its effectiveness cannot be fully determined (TI, 
2007: 5). TI’s rating system measures perceived levels of corruption in a country9. 
These ratings need to take into account further accounts of corruption and charges 
made in Zambia to complete the picture of national trends.  
 
Figure 4.7: Perceptions of Corruption Ratings in Zambia10 
                                                9	  While	  this	  remains	  one	  of	  few	  ways	  to	  measure	  corruption,	  it	  comes	  with	  some	  limitations.	  As	  the	  index	  is	  based	  on	  perception,	  government	  action	  to	  fight	  corruption	  may	  result	  in	  a	  raised	  perception	  by	  the	  polled	  populace	  as	  indicated	  by	  TI.	  Similarly,	  a	  government’s	  slide	  into	  corruption	  may	  go	  undetected	  and	  reduced	  mention	  in	  the	  media,	  again	  altering	  perceptions.	  	  10	  Transparency International’s Perception of Corruption Indicators are scored out of 10, with 10 
indicating no corruption (very clean), and 0 indicating extreme corruption. Therefore on this diagram, 
the rise indicates a reduction in perception.	  
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
	   72	  
 
 (TI, 2001; 2005; 2010) 
 
As indicated in chart 4.7, perceptions of corruption have decreased over the past 
decade. However, the rating of 3.0 given in 2010 still indicates the perception that 
corruption is rampant (Financial Standards Foundation, 2009: 9). As a perverse effect, 
successes in transparency might not always positively reflect in the available 
indictors, as increased levels of transparency within a state can bring greater 
awareness to corruption and thus increase the perceived levels of corruption.  
 
The Relevance of Chinese FDI to Corruption in Zambia 
China’s government argues that the principles in its cooperation allow for sovereignty 
and therefore avoid domestic political issues. Numerous concerns are raised that 
China’s avoidance of debates on internal policies in partner countries and a general 
scarcity of country-based information (Grimm, 2011:2), undermine transparency and 
better governance. China’s principles for sovereignty are regarded as sitting uneasily 
with human rights and corruption (Kaplinsky, 2007:11; Rocha, 2007:16). The practice 
of Chinese Africa policy directly links to critical issues of transparency in several 
ways. In bidding for contracts, transparency is said to be not a criterion for the 
Chinese government; rather, the government of China is alleged to use its sway to 
gain settlements in their favour (Ndulo, 2008: 144).  
 
Despite the government’s claims of non-interference, Chinese MNCs are seen to 
influence transparency and corruption. Numerous reports indicate that Chinese MNCs 
obstruct employee protests – their exercise of right to organise and express themselves 
freely – through coercive means. Chinese companies are said to use threats and other 
tactics for cases that go to court often have witnesses intimidated (Michel et al., 2009: 
Stellenbosch University  http://scholar.sun.ac.za
	   73	  
235; Kragelund, 2010: 216). While the Zambian government occasionally reprimands 
the managers of Chinese companies, it has dropped a number of cases. TI Zambia’s 
president, Reuben Lifuka, sees this as a decline in the belief in the Zambian judicial 
system (TI, 2007: 5). Alleged bribery of union officials in combination with the 
tactics described above of Chinese companies are a perceived challenge to the 
Zambian society to maintain control over its own issues. While rules exist to protect 
employees and the environment, institutions are seen to be too weak to enforce them 
(The Economist, 20 April 2011).  
 
Overall levels of corruption in Zambia allow influence without necessarily having a 
clear intent to challenge corruption for own ends; yet, the risks for such practice to 
emerge are high. China’s official position on state sovereignty and non-interference 
might thus mean that Chinese MNCs are put in a position to utilize corrupt practices 
with reprimands and consequence only coming from the relatively weak Zambian 
government itself (Mawdsley, 2007: 414).  
 
Even though more often than not anecdotal in nature, the numerous cases and reports 
reviewed – both from Western and Zambian authors – indicate Chinese FDI to be 
having a negative impact on efforts for transparency and reductions in corruption 
(Brautigam 2009: 13; Mawdsley 2007: 407; Alden 2007: 58; Broadman 2007: 19; 
Ndulo, 2008: 144). The value of transparency for development is clear through the 
real freedoms and opportunities it provides a population. The stated hands-off official 
Chinese practice in this topic area is likely to have negative effects on the 
developmental progress. The debate exists where Chinese supporters would argue 
minimal influence on state, while opponents utilize case studies and reports to argue 
Chinese FDI has undermined Zambian progress towards transparency and the fight 
against corruption (Mawdsley, 2007: 407). As is the nature of this indicator, the 
information available remains weak in capacity to substantiate overall trends, reliant 
on specific case studies and quotes.  
 
4.3.3 Strength of State Institutions 
An effective state is regarded as a prerequisite for a well-functioning market (Cheru et 
al., 2010, 236). The strength of institutions indicator measures the ability of the 
government to govern its own affairs and respond to issues of state. This in turn 
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indicates its capacity to direct its future while responding to citizen needs. These 
requirements are understood as essential for developmental progress to be actualized. 
Within the debate, Chinese FDI is challenged for its potential influence in weakening 
state institutions through undermining measures and taxing the state with the 
challenges aforementioned in other indicators.  
 
Strength of State Institutions in Zambia 
The government of Zambia recognizes the potential negative impetus of having an 
economy based heavily on natural resources, particularly mining (Zambian Ministry 
of Finance and National Planning, 2011: 11). Yet, clear evidence does not exist to 
show that it has capacity to begin transitioning away from the focus on natural 
resources. Analysts call for a well-elaborated framework and timeframe to develop 
international economic relations (Mutesa, 2010: 168). The Zambian government’s 
documents11 on future economic planning offer no elaborate strategic comprehension 
on how to work with foreign countries or companies, how to hold them accountable or 
work them into their plans.  
 
The Zambian government is also alleged of lacking a balance between seeking 
economic growth for improved conditions for sustainable development. The emphasis 
of the Zambian government is so heavily on attracting FDI that it might, in fact, be 
limiting the direct benefits that could come with FDI. As Mutesa (2010: 172) argues, 
the government is criticised for being overgenerous with its incentives given to 
foreign investors. This would allow foreign investors to feel above the law, Mutesa 
continues, as institutional capacity was lacking and institutions were underfunded. 
Labour standard, safety, and environmental inspectors are said to be lacking to inspect 
factories and business premises to ensure compliance with laws (Alden, 2007: 3; 
Mutesa, 2010: 172).12 The Afrobarometer (2009: 9) indicates that dissatisfaction with 
Zambia’s democracy by Zambians has increased from 36 per cent of the population in 
1999, to 53 per cent in 2009. This might not least be an indication for voters’ 
                                                11	  Documents	  referred	  to	  include	  the	  Sixth	  National	  Development	  Plan	  (SNDP),	  Public	  Reduction	  Strategy	  Papers	  (PRSPs),	  and	  government	  speeches	  (Ministry	  of	  Financial	  and	  National	  Planning,	  2011;	  Banda,	  2011).	  	  12	  Media	  report	  said	  that	  labour	  inspectors	  in	  Lusaka	  had	  access	  to	  only	  one	  car,	  which,	  additionally,	  was	  out	  of	  commission	  for	  four	  months	  (The	  Economist,	  April	  20,	  2011).	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behaviours in the last election in 2011, leading to a change in government of the first 
time in 20 years.   
 
Despite these raised concerns, the Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI) indicates 
positive national trends in Zambia over the past decade in regards to strength of its 
governmental institutions.13 Chart 4.8 indicates a general improvement in democracy 
and government management alongside the improving market economy, taking place 
over the decade. In its 2010 Report, the BTI (2010:2) reports that the government is 
making progress to improve democracy, with the judiciary said to be remaining 
relatively independent and a functional separation of powers. The report, however, 
does not indicate any foreseeable risks to the further consolidation of the democratic 
state. Whereas FDI does not hold a position to directly strengthen institutions other 
than upholding laws and acting with transparency and consideration for its host 
country, there are specific ways it can undermine a country’s institutions. 
 
Figure 4.8: BTI Indicators for Zambia 
 
 (Bertelsmann Siftung, 2003; 2008; 2010)14 
 
                                                13	  The BTI assesses a state on criteria of sustainability, democracy founded on the rule of law, social 
integration, and welfare. Status index rates countries based on their state of democracy and market 
economy. The Management index ranks them according to their leadership’s management performance 
(BTI, 2011).	  14	  The BTI rankings for democracy, market economy, and management range from successful (7-10), 
successful with weakness (5.6-6.9), moderate (4.3-5.59), weak (3-4.25), to failed or non-existent (0-
2.9) (BTI, 2011).	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The Relevance of Chinese FDI to the Strength of Zambia’s State Institutions 
The key challenge for Zambian leadership is to maximize the political and economic 
advantages from the Sino-Zambian relationship while mitigating negative effects. 
This requires the Zambian government to take a greater input into the bilateral 
relations between the two states (including FOCAC), and control over the effects it is 
able to have in Zambia (Le Pere, 2007: 214-215). Beyond the issues mentioned in 
other indicators, there are certain perceived challenges within the Chinese partnership 
argued to be weakening Zambia’s institutions.  
 
Firstly, China is seen as a challenge to NEPAD, as the Chinese government’s goals 
are predominantly bilateral and focused on its own interests; they do not appear to 
consider regional organisations’ norms and interests. Furthermore with its principles 
of sovereignty, its partnerships with illiberal regimes and weak democracies based on 
natural resource economies does not hold the state to higher standards, that NEPAD 
or Western states work to encourage (Alden, 2007: 66, 70). Though all NEPAD 
partners are being impacted by partnership with China under FOCAC, there have been 
no regional or multilateral African responses or propositions, from government or 
NGOs (Alden, 2007: 77). With limited options, Zambia continues to take the risks 
because the need for the potential benefits Chinese partnership may procure. The 
Zambian government and police force are criticised for allegedly providing full 
support to the Chinese government and their business interests, arguing that Chinese 
activities are in favour of Zambian development regardless of Zambian laws that 
would favour the employees (Michel et al., 2009: 236; The Economist, 20 April 
2011).  
 
Zambia’s general development strategy is to formulated as focussing its foreign policy 
towards economic and development issues. Zambian government efforts to promote 
FDI and South-South cooperation require creating favourable conditions for Chinese 
FDI (Mwanawina, 2008:5). While national trends for the strengthening of institutions 
are shown positive by the BTI, Chinese FDI is shown to still bring challenges to 
government institutions, for example by allegedly not playing by the rules in 
engagement with labour. Because of the aspired effects of value added to the national 
GDP, the Zambian government is regarded as remaining eager to support Chinese FDI 
(Kopinski et al., 2011(b): 187). The government realises that using FDI for 
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development will require Zambian strategies that use revenue from copper and FDI to 
improve and sustain infrastructure, education, technology, and manufacturing capacity 
(Ndulo, 2008: 141).15  
 
Critics do not see Zambia having the capacity to address the negative effects 
presented by Chinese FDI in their attempts to handle the issues presented. Criticism 
by Western observers is often harsh and in broad terms: Paul Collier (2007: 86) 
expressed that for developing countries, “[governance] is already bad and the Chinese 
are making it worse”, basing his arguments on lack of transparency and regulation. 
Other analysts raise concern that because China does explicitly not pressure for 
democracy, governance standards, or human rights, it implicitly allows for violations 
and dilutes the attempts of others (Rochea, 2007: 16). To address many of the issues 
observed in the aforementioned indicators, a tighter legal framework and improved 
regulation are needed. The country requires enforcement of serious labour, customs 
and import policies that would prevent the sending many of the socio-economic and 
political issues Chinese FDI poses on Zambia (Taylor, 2009: 171).  
 
Despite an official position of non-interference, the Chinese government took an 
explicitly hostile stance towards the opposition politician Michael Sata in the 2006 
election. While understandable due to Sata’s populist anti-Chinese stance, this 
reaction by the Chinese government overtly interfered in Zambian domestic affairs. It 
is argued that Zambia’s government non-reaction to this interference shows the lack 
of capacity (or lack of willingness) on the Zambian side to challenge China, not least 
because of Zambia’s growing reliance on the economic interests tied into the 
relationship (Kopinski et al., 2011(b): 186; Ndulo, 2008: 146).  
 
In summary, Zambian institutions seem to be strengthening. However, case studies 
offer most of the ‘evidence’ of Chinese FDI opposing the state’s institutions. Even if a 
number of arguments might be brushed away as simple allegations, it remains 
doubtful whether this strengthening of state institutions is because of or rather despite 
Chinese engagement in the form of FDI. There are substantial allegations that argue 
                                                15	  Supporting this, Roy Kapembwa, Head of the Zambian Development Agency expressed “We are 
trying as much as possible to focus on China because they are ready. Where there are opportunities, 
they will take them” (Brautigam, 2009: 104).	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Chinese FDI to not be conducive to the strengthening of state institutions. 
Government’s policy space in Zambia appears to be increasing, with less debt burden 
(which is NOT based on Chinese engagement) and ‘fresh money’ from Beijing. It 
appears to be this mix of factors rather than one factor (China) on its own that has 
positive effects also for the development of Zambia.   
 
 
4.4 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has exemplified how analysts argue Chinese FDI has a substantial 
influence on Zambia’s course to development. As this chapter has also shown, key 
national indicators in Zambia suggest that, overall; Zambia is currently on a good path 
to development. However, the debate around Chinese FDI’s role in this positive 
development is less conclusive. The debate suggests Chinese FDI to be conducive in 
various indicators particularly with regard to economic growth and possibly 
infrastructure expansion as well as availability of government’s finance in the shape 
of aid and loans. However, arguments indicate a mixed of benefits and costs in the 
sectors of employment and dependency. In regards to the strength of Zambia’s 
institutions, transparency and corruption, and market diversification, Chinese FDI is 
discussed rather as being relatively unfavourable. The debate on both sides relies 
heavily on case studies and rather anecdotal evidence due to limited information. As 
such, there is no one clear argument on whether Chinese FDI is overall conducive to 
Zambian development or not. Rather, the debate, as followed within these indicators, 
show progress in differentiating and in isolating key issues and prospects.  
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5. Research Overview 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
The Chinese government’s partnership and FDI come with promises of development. 
Since 2000, not least so with the inception of FOCAC as a framework, China 
strengthened its relationship with Zambia and most other sub-Saharan African states 
as part of its new plans for economic expansion. Since this date, Chinese FDI has 
increased in Zambia. Alongside interests in mineral extraction, Chinese enterprises 
gained international clout, and an increased market for Chinese goods. With a unique 
background including differing approaches to domestic-, corruption-, and social 
responsibility- issues, questions arise as to whether and how Chinese FDI will 
influence Zambia’s developmental course.  
 
This study set out to consider the relevance and conduciveness of Chinese FDI for 
Zambian development, and the substantiation of arguments provided in the 
surrounding debate. As Chinese FDI into Zambia has steadily increased since 2000 
through a distinctive partnership between governments, study of its propitiousness for 
Zambian development is merited. In order to do so, this study developed a framework 
of key socio-economic and political indicators in light of Capability Approach 
development theory. These factors were selected for their indicative relevance to both 
FDI and development.  
 
 
5.2 Framework, Methodology, Theory and Chapter Overview 
 
The study began with conceptualizations of FDI and development. It examined the 
connections between FDI and development, while being aware that there is no easy or 
straightforward causality between development and increasing levels of FDI. FDI is 
only one of many influences on a state; therefore national trends cannot directly 
indicate the impact of FDI. To merit assessment, consideration of both national trends 
and relevant reports and information on specific activity within the various indicators 
were fused. While direct conclusions remain limited, a study of the correlation 
between the two variables remain significant.  
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Chapter three provided contextual information surrounding Zambia’s socio-economic 
and political history. It then reviewed the spectrum of Western involvement in 
Zambia, another partnership and source of FDI. The context of Chinese partnership 
and FDI was consequently reviewed in light of Zambia’s developmental needs. 
Chapter Four analysed national trends and specific information on Chinese action 
relevant to key indicators, applying the framework established in Chapter two. This 
final chapter will review the relevance of this study for other African states in the 
context of similarities between Zambia and other African states in terms of 
development and FDI relationship with China. It will conclude with suggestions for 
further research.  
 
5.2.1 Theoretical Framework 
Development per definition is the improved capacity of a state to meet its own needs 
and continue its own economic growth, reducing its dependency on other states while 
improving its own structures and the capacity of its populace to live autonomous 
sustainable lives. For developing countries, attaining funds and support for addressing 
developmental issues such as education, health, infrastructure, and employment is 
often essential. Aid is used for directly addressing these issues. Loans are procured so 
that governments have greater capacity to direct their own funds towards needed 
issues. Both loans and aid can come with stipulations and requirements. When 
studying the impacts of aid or loans, studies can look directly towards developmental 
levels. Measurements can be directly attributed to funds provided and their 
achievement of intended outcomes. Capability Approach theory maximizes the study 
of the process of development, rather than the means, and is able to offer insight into 
the debate surrounding FDI in development by assessing it not through end results, 
but by contextualizing them within the capacities of citizens and the government.   
 
The intent of FDI by investors is to maximize potential profits. Yet, FDI 
conceptualized as the investments made within a state by foreign actors, whether 
private or state-run, has the capacity to influence a country’s development (Todaro & 
Smith, 2009: 824). While FDI can have influence on a country’s society, economy, 
and politics, its influences are not direct and cannot be measured through traditional 
developmental indicators. For a developing country with significant levels of FDI 
inflow, understanding the influence that FDI is having on its development.  
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This study evaluated several key indicators. In the socio-economic field, economic 
growth through GDP trends provided a straightforward context the economy’s size. 
Infrastructure expansion analysed the furthering of infrastructure necessary for 
sustained economic growth. Market diversification reviewed trends of percentage of 
GDP found within different economic sectors. Comparative trends within agriculture, 
industry and services indicate the direction of the economy and reliance on natural 
resources or expansion to manufacturing and services with market diversification. 
Finally, labour and employment reviewed employment figures over the decade. 
Formal employment trends indicate levels of employment on a national level. The 
indicator also explored issues within employment to foreign nationals for their 
potential influence on society and the transference of skills and technology, which 
would be conducive for improved local business and skill sets to attract further 
business. These factors give oversight to the national socio-economic trends that 
pertain both to FDI and to propitious potential for development. 
 
In terms of the political sphere, three key indicators were reviewed. Economic 
dependency was used to assess external debt and loans as compared to GDP. Trends 
would show either an increased reliance on external funds or an increase of self-
reliance on the state to fund its budget. Transparency and corruption reviewed the 
perceptions of corruption from TI within the state at a national level. Finally, strength 
of institutions was measured through the BTI indicators complimented by their 
country specific reports showing trends for democracy and management. Overall 
these indicators provide a basis for the political realm as potentially influenced by FDI 
that are relevant to development taking place.  
 
 
5.3 Main findings 
 
Deliberating over specific indicators is a challenge, when needing to assess the overall 
picture of the developmental implications Chinese FDI has had for Zambia in the past 
decade. Questions are raised as to whether allowing for FDI because of its benefits to 
economic growth alone merit its value. For a developing country with such high 
levels of poverty and its surrounding issues, debate is raised whether potential 
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negative future implications are moot considerations. Chart 5.1 provides a summary 
review of the trends studied.  
 
The first column reviews the national trend shown over the decade. These trends, 
while indicating the overall direction, are influenced by countless actors, decisions, 
and factors. Chinese FDI remains one of many contributing influences. It is not 
necessarily directly aligned to national figures provided.  
 
The second column indicates the relevance of the indicator to development as 
observed through the study. It is ranked as high, moderate, low, or not applicable, as 
to its pertinence to Zambia’s development, and therefore its value as an indicator to 
the overall debate. These rankings are provided by an evaluation of the assessments of 
each variable found in Chapter Two. 
 
The third column reviews the available information included in this chapter to assess 
the contribution or challenge Chinese FDI has provided to this factor as discussed in 
the literature. As much of the study remains qualitative, rankings are set as positive, 
neutral, or negative. Positive refers to trends and overall influence being considered as 
conducive or furthering the potential for sustainable development in Zambia. Neutral 
indicates little or no change in terms of conditions for development. Negative 
indicates a perceived digression from development, or the debate focussing on an 
overall impediment to development potential being actualized for Zambia.  
 
Lastly the fourth column reviews the strength of information that substantiates this 
assessment, i.e. it looks at the quality of evidence in the debate. Whereas some 
indicators were discussed in national studies and based on clear information, others 
were rather in the discussion based on speculation, individual quotes, and narrow case 
studies, with limited availability of information to fully substantiate the claims on 
either side of the debate. This column is attributing the values of strong, moderate, 
weak, or not available to the level of evidence in the debate. Together this information 
presents an overall review and evaluation of the debate surrounding the relevance and 
conduciveness of Chinese FDI to Zambia’s development within key socio-economic 
and political indicators.  
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Table 5.1: Overview of Trends Observed of Chinese FDI and Zambian Development  
Indicator Overall 
National 
Trends  
Overall 
Relevance 
of Indicator 
in the 
Debate 
Assessment of 
Direction of 
Debate 
Strength of 
Information to 
Substantiate 
the Arguments 
Socio-Economic Overview 
Economic Growth Positive High Conducive Strong 
Infrastructure Expansion Positive Moderate Conducive Weak 
Market Diversification Inconclusive High Not Conducive Moderate 
Employment Positive High Inconclusive, 
various levels 
considered 
Strong 
Political Overview 
Reduction of Dependency Positive Moderate Inconclusive Weak 
Transparency and Corruption Negative  Moderate Not Conducive Weak 
Strength of Institutions Positive High Not Conducive Weak 
  
 
Chinese FDI has been discussed as conducive for development in the socio-economic 
factors. The steady increases of FDI since 2000 have supported the economic growth 
and employment numbers. In this trend, Chinese efforts in offering support for 
construction projects have been discussed as furthering the progress of infrastructure 
expansion, though the value of their efforts are impeded by low quality work and 
preferential employment of Chinese workers over Zambians. Employment benefits 
were challenged by the reported low wages, poor working conditions, and limited 
inclusion of Zambians in managerial positions within MNCs operating within Zambia. 
This, it is argued, prevents some transference of skills, otherwise assumed to come 
with FDI. As Chinese FDI efforts are primarily focused on copper, critics emphasise 
that the increased Chinese investments only heighten national dependence on its 
mining. Furthermore, Chinese firms in Zambia, and the dumping of cheap products 
are regarded as undermining local business and Zambia’s manufacturing sector. 
Overall, despite setbacks and discussed limitations to the value offered to Zambia’s 
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society and economy, Chinese FDI appears to be rather regarded as conducive to 
sustainable developmental progress in Zambia by the larger parts of the academic 
literature.  
 
Politically national trends presented in the literature are regarded as furthering 
positive conditions favourable to development in Zambia. Zambia’s government is 
seen as managing to reduce its economic dependency by cutting down on its debts. In 
terms of national corruption, while TI (2010) still heavily criticises corruption levels, 
the trend is not discussed as worsening in the country, despite a reduction in 
government efforts to fight graft. The BTI (2011) shows an overall strengthening of 
the government and maintains a positive outlook for the Zambian government. 
 
As emphasized in Critical Theory, the strengthening of the abilities of the government 
to make its own decisions is developmentally advantageous. However, the trends 
experienced in worsening corruption and debt offer evidence of limited autonomies, 
and inevitably have negative consequences for the real freedoms of Zambian citizens.   
Against this background of an overall positive national outlook, Chinese FDI is rather 
discusses as having an overall negative influence on Zambia’s political sphere. With 
limited information on Chinese aid and loans, little can be said about their influence 
on reducing dependency on foreign sources for funds, except that incidentally their 
support for economic growth (both direct and indirect) does give the Zambian 
government a larger national budget to work with. Numerous incidents are discussed 
as Chinese MNCs and government officials detracting from transparency and the fight 
against corruption within Zambia; China’s policy of ‘no political interference’ only 
seems to be upheld when in the interest of the Chinese government. As presented in 
this debate, it leaves Chinese FDI to be regulated solely by the Zambian government 
(with no apparent effort by Beijing itself), which is impeded by lack of resources, 
capacity, and a tendency to corruption.  
 
The overall debate and dialogue surrounding Chinese FDI and its relevance to 
development in Zambia remains limited by information and speculation. The 
challenge of arguments based on different understandings of development has been 
limiting. The utilization of Capability Approach in assessing the arguments, looking 
not only for ends of subsequent socioeconomic and political realities influenced by 
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Chinese FDI, but also at the process gives strength to assessment. The realities of 
recognizing real freedoms in the population and government to act to their full 
potential are limited. In many of the aforementioned factors due to specific Chinese 
policies or realities that need to be addressed or mitigated against for maximum 
developmental progress to be actualized. The transformation of resources into 
valuable activities is seen through the extraction of natural resources boosting the 
economy. However the limitations in market diversification, as well as the base level 
employment it is providing is another limiter. This is furthered in an evaluation of the 
distribution of opportunities in society. Chinese employment is minimal in terms of 
the opportunities provided at large, particularly in higher skilled level professions and 
training. Finally in terms of the materialistic and non-materialistic benefits, the aid 
and partnership that comes subsequent to the economic ties and FDI do offer some 
benefits to society at large, in terms of infrastructure improvements and capacities felt 
there for development.  
 
5.4  Significance of Findings  
 
The significance of this study is broad, as its discourse for analysis can be applied to a 
wide scope of areas of study.  This study offers an evaluation of the debate around 
FDI’s relevance to development. In the case of Zambia, it systematically reviewed the 
debate on China’s FDI in comparison to national socio-economic and political 
indices. It contributes to discussion on the relevance for FDI to development, as well 
as the significance of the structure and conditions in which FDI is handled in a 
developing country.  
 
In this study, the use of key socio-economic and political indicators can offer insight 
into debates around developmental strategies surrounding FDI. They can show what 
issues are focused on. Collectively these indicators provide a contextual 
understanding of the consequences of various approaches to FDI and development so 
they can be critically evaluated for their intended value. This information can be 
relevant to a host government in addressing limitations and mitigating negative effects 
raised by FDI by asking the ‘right questions’ with regard to FDI and its 
developmental effect. This study is thus a contribution to theoretical studies on FDI 
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and development, and to Zambia’s developmental efforts in regards to its partnership 
with the Chinese government and MNCs. 
 
 
5.5 Areas for Further Study 
 
Several questions remain that should guide further research into the relationship 
between FDI and development, and its measurement. First, additional research into 
each of the indicators included in this study to better substantiate the arguments would 
be valuable. Each of the indicators could, for instance, be further explored with 
interviews and access to information available within Zambia. Furthermore, 
improving statistical measuring of factors is a continuous task. Whether due to issues 
of transparency or capacity, both the Zambian and Chinese government do not have 
up to date records on many accounts. The further blurring of lines between Chinese 
aid, trade, and FDI limit full comprehension of where different activities lie. 	  
Secondly, the relation between FDI and development does not only exist in a socio-
economic or political realm as used in the assessed elements of the debate on Chinese 
FDI’s developmental impact. Investments have potential impacts on the physical 
environment, culture, international relations, and numerous other realities for the host 
country that could be considered in further studies. A study of the relationship 
between FDI and development is thus much more complex and would be enriched by 
also considering various other factors that have been beyond the scope of this study.  	  
Finally, comparative aspects would help to put the debate into perspective in the 
broader context of Chinese relations with Africa as a whole. There is further scope for 
research in comparing and contrasting the study of Chinese FDI in Zambia with other 
countries. Comparing reports of other specific countries investing in Zambia could 
strengthen studies to gain better comprehension of FDI influence in Zambia on a 
comparative study between states. The study of Chinese FDI could also be extended 
to other developing countries or African states to extend analysis to a larger region. 
The FOCAC policies and principles are central to Chinese partnership with numerous 
African states with similar interest in natural resources in exchange for FDI and aid.  
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